Brief History

Contemporary Iraq, as the rest of the Middle East, was founded after the WWI and the dismantling of the Othman Empire, where the provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul were placed within the framework of one country, Iraq.
Iraq remained under the British mandate until 1932, when it gained its independence in the name of the Iraqi Kingdom and became a member of the League of Nations.
Despite independency, Iraq did not witness political stability, as it remained in the royal era witnessing instability in addition to popular uprisings and demonstrations against the royal family and governments who were driven by and controlled by British policies.
August 1933, a year after independence, the first mass massacres were committed in Iraq by the government and the Iraqi army and with British cover against Christians of Semele area ​​in Dohuk governorate that killed 5,000 people and deported the inhabitants of dozens of villages to Syria where they were settled in Khabour area in northeastern Syria.
In 1936, Iraq witnessed the first military coup in the Middle East.
Likewise, the second coup took place in 1958 against the royal era, and Iraq adopted the republican regime that did not witness a peaceful transfer of power. The coups continued, two coups in 1963, and another coup in 1968 that brought the Baath Party to the power and that Iraq under its rule suffered internal wars and with neighboring countries (the Iran-Iraq war 1980 – 1988), the first Gulf war 1991 after the invasion of Kuwait, the second Gulf war 2003 which aimed to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Since 2003, due the collapse of the state in the 2003 war, the security void, the proliferation of militias and their parties, and Iranian, American and Turkish interventions, Iraq is still not politically and security stable and the resulting economic collapse and the collapse of public structures and facilities.

Iraq is a part of the Holy Land

The geography of the contemporary Iraqi state is part of the historical geography of Mesopotamia mentioned in the Acts (2:9). If the geography currently known to the Holy Land is linked to or defined by the political geography of the existing states, specifically Israel, then in fact, Iraq is part of the Holy Land with its geography and Biblical events.
Uruk in southern Iraq is the mother city of Ibrahim, father of all believers.
Many of the prophets of the Old Testament, Daniel, Ezekiel, Ezra, and Nahum lived in Iraq for one reason or another for a period or another, and some of them died and their shrines still there.
Nineveh, the Assyrian capital, received Jonah, the prophet who preached her, called her to repentance, and heeded his call.
Hence, the sons of Mesopotamia were aware of the Old Testament and its prophecies, and perhaps this was one of the reasons for their rapid acceptance of Christianity from its first generation.
Also, the Jews remained part of the sons of Mesopotamia, with its historical geography, and thus Iraq, with its contemporary borders.

Religious, ethnic and cultural diversity in Iraq

Iraq is distinguished by its rich ethnic, religious, doctrinal, and cultural pluralism when compared to its area and population.
Perhaps the reason for this richness is its geographical location and its ancient historical roots.
The ethnic diversity in Iraq is represented by an Arab majority in addition to the Kurds, Assyrians (also known as Chaldeans and Syriacs), Turkmen and Armenians.
Each of these components has its own mother tongue, where Arabic is the dominant language, and then Kurdish, both official languages, and Syriac, the mother tongue of Assyrians Syriac Chaldeans, Turkmen and Armenian.
While its religious diversity expands from the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam), to older religions than Christianity such as Yezidism, Sabean Mandaeans and Zoroastrianism, in addition to other religions such as Kaka’i and Baha’i.
Muslims represent the vast majority, with nearly 95% two-thirds of them Shiites and the other third of Sunnis.
While Christianity was the second religion in Iraq, where the percentage of Christians was 3% of the Iraqi population, it is because of immigration in terms of civil lifestyle and the rate of family members has become five people. Today it is the third religion in Iraq, and with a population that does not reach 1%, while Yezidism has become the second religion.

Who are the Iraqi Christians?

Excluding the Armenians who are a small ethnic group whose majority fled from their homeland in Anatolia before and during WW1 because of the Ottoman genocide against them and other Christians, the Iraqi Christians are the indigenous people of Iraq and their roots go back thousands of years before Christianity in the lands of Mesopotamia.
In other words, the Iraqi Christians are the descendants and inherit of native people of Iraq from Assyrians.
They are not a new Christian community that was “evangelized” by western missionaries as the case of many African and East Asian Christian communities.
Iraqi Christians and churches go back to the first Christian generations who adopted Christianity through Jesus Christ apostles. Their Christianity and existence in Iraq is prior Islam and Arabs.

The ethnic and cultural identity of Iraqi Christians

The Iraqi Christians belong to various Churches and denominations, but they join in common grounds of ethnicity and culture. They speak eastern dialect of Syriac, which is the local language that descended from Aramaic, the language spoken by Jesus Christ.
However, many Iraqi Christians who lived in big cities such as Baghdad, Mosul and Basra for long time abandoned and forgot their mother language and started speaking Arabic due to political pressure and persecution. They nevertheless still believe they are not Arabs and therefore kept their mother tongue Syriac as the main language of their religious rituals.
Syriac, like other living languages, has different dialects. Each dialect has its characters depending on the demography and the surrounding circumstances. It is important here to say that the map of Syriac dialects do not necessarily synchronize with various Churches of Iraqi Christians. This means that followers of different churches may speak a specific dialect while followers of one Church might speak different dialects.
However, speaking and understanding among these people are normal and easy because linguistic differences of various dialects are minor and are of pronouncing nature only.

The Iraqi Christians have in common same customs and social traditions, which reflect their unified identity and Christian principles and values since their embracing Christianity in its very early stages in Mesopotamia at the hands of Mar Thomas, one of the twelve apostles and Mar Adai and Mar Mary (male name), two of the seventy apostles.

Despite the accumulated historical diversity and schism in their theological views and Churches, the Iraqi Christians do exercise intermarriages. And despite the multi names that this cultural and ethnic entity was called they firmly believe in the unity of their ethnicity, culture and destiny.
The Catholics who are united with the Catholic Roman Church were called Chaldeans since they united with Rome in the sixteenth century, while the followers of the Eastern Church (Historically known as Nestorians) are called Assyrians.
The followers of the Syriac Church (Orthodox and Catholic) are called Syriac, which is the Arabic translation of Word “Assyrians”
The common history and existence of Iraqi Christians makes them a unity to confront their destiny and safeguard their heritage, identity, existence and future in their national homeland Mesopotamia, which is called Iraq today.

Iraqi Christians’ Churches

Assyrian Chaldean Syriac Christian community in Iraq, as all other Christian communities all over the world, is composed of many churches’ families, as follows
The following is a diagram of these families

I- Catholic Family: Is the biggest family but not the oldest. The members of the Catholic family are:
1- Chaldean Catholic Church: is the part of the Assyrian Church of the East (Nestorian Church) which split from the mother church and united with the Roman Catholic Church in 16^th century.
Chaldean church is the biggest Iraqi church.
The current Chaldean patriarch is His Beatitude Cardinal Mar Luis Sako. His see is in Baghdad.
Chaldean dioceses in Iraq are in Baghdad, Kirkuk, Erbil, Nineveh, Alqosh, Duhok, Zakho, and Basrah.
Other dioceses are in Middle East countries: Iran, Syria, Turkey and Lebanon.
In Diaspora: USA (two), Canada, Australia and Patriarchal Vicariates for Europe.
2- Syriac Catholic Church: is the part of the Syriac Orthodox Church which split from the mother church and united with the Roman Catholic Church.
The current patriarch is His Beatitude Mar Ignatius Yonan whose see is in Beirut – Lebanon.
In Iraq, the church has two dioceses in Mosul and Baghdad, besides many parishes in Nineveh Plain, Basrah and Kirkuk.
3- Latin Church: The diocese centre is in Baghdad. Before ISIS 2014 there were other parishes in Mosul and Basrah.
4- Armenian Catholic Church has a parish. Before ISIS 2014, it had communities in Baghdad, Mosul and Basrah.

II- Orthodox Family:

1- Syriac Orthodox Church: It is the mother church of Syriac Catholic Church. Syriac Orthodox Church has an important presence in Iraq, particularly in Nineveh plain and Baghdad, and in Mosul before ISIS 2014 where currently onle few families returned to Mosul but none of the churches is conducting regular services.
The Syriac Orthodox Patriarchate is in Sayednaya (close by Damascus) – Syria. His Holiness Patriarch Mor Ignatius Aphrem II is the current patriarch.
In Iraq, there are three dioceses: Mosul and Kurdistan, Baghdad and Mar Mattai, besides many parishes in the different Iraqi cities, towns and townships.
The church dioceses exist in Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Holy Lands, India, Europe, Australia, North and South America.
2- Armenian Orthodox Church: The diocese centre is in Baghdad. The parishes are in Baghdad, Erbil, Duhok, Zakho, Kirkuk, Basrah and Mosul before ISIS 2014.

III- Church of the East: It was founded by the first generation of Apostles in early first and second Christian centuries. It is the oldest Christian church in Iraq, and the mother church of the Chaldean Catholic Church.
Church of the East is the church which was never under Christian governments and rulers throughout its long history. It existed, struggled and survived under Persian, Arab Muslims, Mongolians and Ottomans rulers.
However, the price was too high. The church which was once the biggest church worldwide declined from dozens of millions to dozens of thousands!!
By 1963, the Church of the East split again on the basis of calendar reform; but indeed, on tribal and political backgrounds.

1- Assyrian Church of the East ACOE: The church adopted the new calendar and forms 90% of Church of the East.
His Holiness Mar Awa III is the current patriarch. His see is in Erbil – KRI – Iraq.
Besides the Patriarchal Diocese of Erbil, ACOE has currently three dioceses in Iraq, Nohadra (Duhok), Baghdad and Kirkuk and Diana.
Other dioceses are in Syria, Lebanon, Iran, India (Archdiocese), USA, Australia (Archdiocese), Scandanavia and Germany, Canada, and Europe.
Many other parishes are in Armenia, Russia, and Georgia.
2- Ancient Church of the East: The church keeps, so far, the old calendar.
His Holiness Mar Gewargis Yonan is the elected patriarch whose ordination will take place in Baghdad June 2023.
The patriarchal see is in Baghdad and has one diocese for Iraq and middle east countries.
The Ancient Church of the East has dioceses in USA, Australia, and Canada. Many parishes are in Europe.

IV- Others
There are other Christian churches in Iraq, such as Evangelical, Protestants, Advents, etc.
They are small churches whose members are Christians with Catholic, Orthodox and Church of the East backgrounds and became members of the new churches starting the last decades of 19^th century. These churches exist in the big cities of Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, Basrah and, recently, in Dohuk and Erbil.

The Christian Presence And Role In Iraq

The Christians of Iraq, during the two thousand years of their long history, were an added and civilized value to Iraqi and international society.
The theological, literary, and ritual richness characterized Church of the East and the Syriac Orthodox church and their role in spreading the Gospel to the far East in Tibet, China and Mongolian (One of the patriarchs of the Church of the East, Patriarch Mar Yabalaha (1281 – 1317), was Mongolian) are considered shiny contributions to the history of Christianity, especially the East.
Dialogue and the ecumenical spirit existed between the churches, despite the doctrine disagreements.
Indeed, Patriarch Mar Yabalaha sent a personal representative to Rome for dialogue with the Roman Catholic church.
Indeed, what is today called the Christian-Islamic Dialogue started in Baghdad in the ninth century between the Patriarch of the Church of the East, Timothy the Great and the Abbasid caliph Al-Mahdi.
Also, the churches’ fathers and elites were the bridge of communication between East and West through their translation of Greek philosophical references into Arabic and vice versa.
In addition to the role of them in science and literature throughout history.
The matter continued in modern Iraq, where the presence and the Christian role exceeded their small percentage to the Iraqi population.
This is through government institutions (e.g. The most two famous finance ministers in the history of Iraq were a Jewish and a Christian), Christian educational institutions from kindergarten to university levels, health institutions from hospitals and health centers, public and private banking sector, press and media (the first Iraqi female journalist was a Chaldean Christian from Telkif), Civil society institutions, sport where Christians form the pillars of sports activity in Iraq in the twentieth century, etc.
Community and institutional Christian presence and activity was the most important factor in the modern Iraqi state in the twentieth century.
With the decrease in the Christian demography due to the security situation and the dominance of Islamic organizations, this role has decreased and the civil state has retreated with it.
It might be impossible to restore the Christian demography in Iraq, but it is important and vital to restore the Christian role by establishing and operating active educational and health institutions, humanitarian organizations and civil society institutions that are managed by Christian elites and whose services are directed to all Iraqi society, and this will achieve the revitalization of the role and Christian presence as it will be a positive factor for building bridges and peaceful coexistence between Iraqi societal components, with their various ethnic, religious, and sectarian identities.

Demographic Distribution Of Iraqi Christians

Basing on the above-mentioned historical fact that the Iraqi Assyrian Chaldean Syriac Christians are the indigenous people of Iraq, it is notable that their primary residences are the country plains around the historical capital of the Assyrian Empire of Ninevah (now Mosul)
The surrounding plains of Mosul that stretch east to Erbil and north to southern parts of Turkey are of Christian origin.
Due to the influence of the colonialism and expansion of Islam: Arabs coming from south and Kurds from north and northeast, the whole region was prevailed by Muslims enforcing Christians to become a religious minority striving to survive.
Many Christian towns in the region such as Alqoush, Telkef, Bartila, Zakho, Mangesh, etc. still exist and there is historical existence of Churches as well as Christian communities in big cities in North Iraq such as Mosul (before ISIS) and Iraqi Kurdistan such as Erbil.
Christians do exist also in other big cities such as Baghdad, Kirkuk and Basrah. The roots of this existence go back to earlier Assyrian and Christian existence and it is a natural aspect of social and economic factors that Christians moved to reside in these cities seeking for better life.
The Iraqi Christians lived in Baghdad and Kirkuk since the times of Abbassites, Mongolians and Ottomans.
Other political and security reasons played important roles to encourage the emigration to large cities.
In the second half of last century, emigration to the large Iraqi cities especially Baghdad has significantly increased because their historical inhabitancies and villages in Iraqi Kurdistan, particularly in the regions of Duhok and Erbil, became scenes of military battles between the Kurdish revolution and Central government troops.
The pace of immigration escalated particularly after the Baath regime that took power in Iraq in 1968 and started adopting the policy of burning the land. The policy that aimed on destroying the Assyrian and Kurdish villages in the north and lasted from 1974 to 1988 resulted in obliterating 4000 villages among them some 150 Assyrian Christian villages and destruction of more than 60 ancient Churches.
The regime also practiced the policy of ethnic cleansing by deporting thousands of Assyrians and Kurds to other places and replace Arabs in their homes and villages.
However, starting 1991 and the liberation of the Iraqi Kurdistan region, a significant movement started to return and rebuild the life in the destroyed villages.
This movement increased following the fall of the ex-regime in 2003 where the Christians and other minorities, e.g., Yezidis and Mandeans, became the soft target of the systematic terror campaign against them in the Iraqi territories controlled by Iraqi Federal Government which failed to protect them from the fundamental groups who took advantage of the vacuum of power and law.
Regular and systematic terrorist attacks targeted the churches in Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and Basrah.
Many clergy were slaughtered and over 1500 Christians were murdered for no reason just because of their religion.
This forced Christians to flee the regions under federal government seeking security and stability in Iraqi Kurdistan and Nineveh Plains which was controlled by Kurdistan security forces.
Dozens of thousands of families choose to flee the country and be settled in Diaspora.
The internal displacement and migration to neighboring countries significantly increased when ISIS controlled Mosul and Nineveh Plain (summer 2014).

We may introduce the Christian Demography in Iraq as follows:

I- The geopolitics demography, in terms of population and lands (towns, townships, villages) exists in two regions:
1- Iraqi Kurdistan region: particularly in the governorates of Dohuk and Erbil where around 120 Christian towns, townships and villages exist.
2- Nineveh plain: i.e. the regions of Telkaif, Qaraqosh and Shekhan (East and North East of Mosul). These regions attach Iraqi Kurdistan Region.
II- Population demography in terms of population existence in big mixed cities of Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul (before ISIS), Kirkuk and Sulaymaniya.
The Christian community in Mosul (More than 20.000 before ISIS 2014) is to disappear after two millenniums of existence, as the Christian families are hesitating to return back to Mosul despite been recontroled from ISIS since 2017. The fears from fundamental Islamic groups, cultural and social life are real. Less than 40 families retuned after five years of retaking Mosul by Iraqi army. Dozens of churches of different denominations were active for centuries in Mosul, but Christmas bells last time rang was in 2013. A clear indicator.
This existence in Basrah and Baghdad is decreasing due to the instability of the political and security situation, and the failures in the governmental public services, e.g. health, education, infra-structure, etc.
The families are moving towards Kurdistan or fleeing the country.

The Christian existence which survived for long centuries might be finished if the circumstances are not changed.

Important Remarks on Iraqi Christian Demography

• The current Iraqi administrative structure is composed of 18 governorates (or provinces), each composed of districts (the governorate center is always a district center as well) which, in turn, are composed of a couple of sub-districts, to which the townships and villages belong.
• The difference between the two aforementioned demographic types (i.e. in KRI and the Nineveh Plain, and other parts of Iraq) is that in both KRI and the Nineveh Plain there is a demographic existence of people and land.
  This enables Christians to preserve, practice and improve their collective identity and to have a political and administrative role to participate in the planning and decision making of these territories. In addition, there is the potential and environment to have and operate social and cultural entities/services, adding value to the community, whereas in other parts of Iraq the demographic existence is in terms of a tiny population existence within the roughly seven-million population of Baghdad, or the couple of thousands of Christians scattered amongst the million-plus populations of Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk.

• Speaking in terms of Christian demographic existence in KRI and the Nineveh Plain, we can make an important distinction. The existence in KRI is mostly in rural villages (over 100) and in the big cities like Duhok, Ankawa (the sub-district in Erbil), Zakho and others; the absolute majority of those villages is not mixed, i.e. all their people are Christian, while only a couple of them are mixed with Yazidis and/or Muslims, such as Sorka, Sorya and others.
  The size of the villages ranges from the small (up to 15 families) to the large (less than 100 families) and even to the largest of them, where the quantity reaches 250 families.The Christian villages in KRI are very exceptional ones in the history of the region.The Christians have never returned to the villages and regions from which they were forced to flee, e.g. Hakari, Tur Abdin (in modern Turkey), Urmia (in North Iran) and in Khabour (Syria). Only in Iraqi Kurdistan have the deported Christians gone back to their home villages and rebuilt their lives.

• The existence in the Nineveh Plain is mainly in terms of semi-large populated townships and towns. In many cases, Christian towns in the Nineveh Plain are district centers (e.g. Hamdaniya) or sub-districts (Bartilla, Alqosh).
• There are no Christian towns or villages in Iraq south of the Nineveh Plain to the Saudi and Kuwaiti borders, nor to the eastern and western Iraqi borders. This fact illustrates the importance of current and future matters concerning Iraqi Christians amid geopolitical circumstances. It also poses new questions on the structure and future of Iraq and neighboring countries.

• The Christian Assyrian demography in KRI and Nineveh Plain is a continuity of the same demography in Northeast Syria and Southeast Turkey (Tur Abdin), similar to the Kurdish demography in KRI which is a continuation of the Kurdish demography in Iran, Turkey and Syria. This is another important factor to be considered in the long-term geopolitical strategy and borders of the region.

Figures for Christian Demography in Iraq

Iraq, as all other Arabic and Islamic states where many ethnic and religious minorities exist, lacks the transparency regarding the statistics and figures about these minorities and their political, religious, social and cultural conditions.
However, with the fall of the ex-regime, many of the secret documents, statistics and reports were released and became available for the researchers.
A very important report that was written by the Political Department in the General Security Directorate and introduced to the high offices of the ex-regime about the Iraqi religious minorities according to Iraqi census 1977 says: “The results of the latest census of 1977 show Muslims in Iraq are the most majority of the population. Their number is 11 474 293 persons; This is around 97% of Iraqi population which is 11 862 620. Therefore, the other four religious groups (Christians, Yezedians, Mandeans, Jews) are religious minorities in Iraq. Their numbers are as follows: Christians 253 478 i.e. 2,14% of Iraqi population, Yezedians 102 191 i.e. 0.86%, Mandeans 15 937 i.e. 0.14% and Jews 381 i.e. 0.01%”
The most dangerous indicator in the study is the continuous decrease in the annual population growth of Iraqi Christians. The paragraph titled “Population growth indicators between religious groups in Iraq 1947 – 1977” says: “The population growth average between Christians was very close to that of Muslims for the period 1947 – 1957. The average was more than 3% per year. We notice this growth started to decrease rapidly to 1.6% between 1957 and 1965. Despite this is a very small average, but it continued to decrease rapidly to reach 0.73% per year between 1965 and 1977. This is a very low average and is close to the population growth average in developed countries.” 
Operation World based in UK says the Christian annual growth in Iraq was – 0.9% by 2002!!!

It is estimated there was more than one million Christian in Iraq by 2003 out of ca. 26 million.
Indeed, it is doubtful figure.
Currently, the estimated number for Christians in Iraq is ca. 300,000 out of ca. 40 million Iraqis. 

Iraqi Christian Population Annual Growth

Iraqi Christians Pre-ISIS (2003 – 2014)

The collapse of Saddam regime in April 2003 was not just a regime change in its literal meaning only similar to other coup case scenario that took place in Middle East countries and elsewhere.
Saddam regime had been a totalitarian one which held an iron firm grip on the individuals and families of Iraqi community, and hence forward on all of the Iraqi state institutions which resulted in collapsing of the state itself, not the regime. The resulted vacuum of this downfall especially the spread of weapons, the absence of the rule of law, the accumulated conflict among the Iraqi community, the various affiliates to political organizations which existed before toppling the regime or those which were established within and after it fell, having the neighboring countries’ fingers in these political parties, added to that the failure of the educational and economic situation under the then regime which generated organized crime. As a consequence, Iraq after 2003 was transformed into a territory of political parties influence along with their loyal militias which each one by itself imposed their own rule of law in areas they thrived.
On the other side, the minorities who have been weak and scattered demographically due to lack of influential political and military establishments, their differences in ethnic and religious identity, added to that the situation in which Christians and Mandeans had a well financial status made them an easy target in the mid-south Iraq area by jihadist doctrinal militias, Sunni and Shia, as well as by organized crime gangs.
Shlomo Documentation Organization published a statistic stated that 1174 Christians among which 14 clergymen have been killed between 2003 and 2014 (pre-ISIS) in territories under the Iraqi central government. In the terrorist assault on The Lady of Survival Church in Baghdad alone on 31 October 2010, 53 faithful were martyred while attending church service. Whereas 114 attacks targeted churches in Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, Anbar, some of which have been targeted more than once. In addition to targeting their income resources, kidnapping cases for ransom, legislations and Islamic pressure.
All of these systematic assaults based on religious identity left the Christians with no choice but to flee to harmless areas domestically to Nineveh plain and Kurdistan region, or applying for resettlement visas to western countries. Some cities have become completely Christians free such as Ramadi, Khalidiya and Habaniya, whereas their presence has considerably decreased in other key cities of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. It had been estimated that in Baghdad alone quarter a million Christians lived there before 2003, this number have been decreased to approximately 40 thousand. Around 16 churches have been shut down in Baghdad alone.
Therefore, IDPs headed to Kurdistan which had been safe, stable and free from terrorist groups and violence; and Nineveh plain as a safe territory as well because of being been under the command of Peshmarga forces and Kurdistan Asayesh (security personnel) and other social and economic reasons.

Indeed, there had been multiple displacement waves to Kurdistan and Nineveh plain started from the early days after April 2003, where there has been individual displacement; to massive displacement waves should the Christian have been targeted in larger cities. For instance: in 2004, 2006 and 2010. The same case applied to Yazidi community who had been fleeing the larger cities, especially Mosul city in which no Yazidi person remained in just before ISIS took control, to Kurdistan and Nineveh plain where the Yazidi community complexes.
According to a survey conducted by Christian Aid Program – Nohadra – Iraq CAPNI in October 2006, for every three Christian families in Nineveh Plain, the fourth was a displaced family.
The ration was even more in the governorate of Duhok.
This ration increased significantly in later years, mainly under and post ISIS.

Iraqi Christians under ISIS

June 2014, ISIS controlled the city of Mosul, the Nineveh Plain, along with the governorates of Iraqi Kurdistan, turned into a safe haven for Mosul Christians and other non-Muslim and non-Sunni communities fleeing from ISIS.
August 3^rd ISIS advanced to the Yazidi-dominated Sinjar region where, with its control, it committed the worst crimes of genocide, sexual slavery and captivity, as well as the destruction of public and private properties.
August 6^th ISIS headed to Nineveh Plain who had gained three days’ break in which its inhabitants were able to escape to the governorates of Duhok and Erbil.
 
It is a painful coincidence that on the night of August 6, 81 years ago (1933), the Semile massacre began against the Christian Assyrians and its memory remains stuck in the collective memory of the people, and the wound is renewed again on 6 August 2014.

 
Thus, the Nineveh Plain was displaced for the first time in its history, where the Plain was completely emptied from its Christians, Yazidis and Shiite Shabaks.
It is estimated that around 120,000 Christians were displaced because of ISIS. They took refuge in all-over Kurdistan, mainly in Duhok governorate in the big cities and dozens of Christian villages, and in Ankawa – Erbil where six camps were installed to host them.
Caravan churches and schools were installed as well.
The occupation of the Nineveh Plain has caused tremendous damage to personal and public properties, in addition to religious and archaeological sites and buildings, as well as infrastructure, shops, agricultural and industrial facilities and others.
30 churches or church properties in Mosul and 46 in Nineveh Plains had been subjected to total or partial harm as a result of ISIS occupation of Mosul and Nineveh Plains.
Thousands of Christians families’ houses, shops and assets were destroyed, burnt and looted.
The short and long-term effects of ISIS control of the Nineveh Plain have gone beyond the enormous physical and economic destruction that requires decades to rehabilitate. However, it also directly and seriously affected the position and vision of Christians, individuals and families and community collectively, to the reality and future of their existence in their historic places even after its retaking. Demolition transcends physical boundaries to moral and psychological effects and harms of individual and collective human dignity.
It also affected the links between the community components, especially among Christians and Yazidis, on the one hand, and Muslims, specifically the Sunnis, on the other.
These, among other things, are the challenges of post-ISIS and post-return to the Nineveh Plain.

Current Challenges Faced By Iraqi Christians

The Christians of Iraq, like all Iraqis, face great challenges arising from and after the ISIS stage and add to the challenges that Iraq has experienced since its collapse as a country in 2003.
Perhaps the most important common challenges facing Christians today in Iraq are:
First: Political instability in Iraq, which is not a direct result of ISIS stage, but rather exists and continues since the collapse of the Iraqi state and its institutions in 2003 with the end of the previous regime.
However, instability has increased after ISIS in terms of the complete domination of Shiite political parties over the political decision of the federal government and the marginalization of Sunni role, in addition to the decline in the Kurdish political and security role, especially after its loss of lands and areas that it was managing in Sinjar, Kirkuk and the Nineveh Plain.
The political hegemony of Shiite parties supported by Iranian Shiite has turned Iraq into an arena of political and military conflict between Iran and the United States.
As a result, the lack of a clear vision for a stable Iraq with functioning legislative and executive institutions is one of the major challenges facing everyone.
But the Iraqi national and religious minorities are the most fearful and concerned about this challenge. This fear is reflected in their search for another country for stability. Hence, instability leads to more immigration.
For example, the general percentage of Christians returning to the Nineveh Plain in the areas that were under the control of ISIS has not yet reached the 50%, despite the fact that this percentage exceeded 70% in a few areas (such as the Teliskuf) and others (such as Telkeif) still until today did not reach 8%.
Second: Security instability is the latest result of the collapse of the Iraqi state and its military and security institutions after 2003, but it has multiplied with the proliferation of weapons outside the state’s control, especially in the form of militia organizations of Shiite Islamist political parties loyal to Iran.
It can even be said that these militias, especially after their participation in the fight against ISIS, have turned into an army parallel to the Iraqi army and possess heavy weapons and more than one hundred thousand members are affiliated with them.
And if it is formally considered to be one of the official military formations, it is actually outside the control of the Iraqi state and subject to the decisions of its orthodox parties.
Third: With political and security instability on the one hand, and corruption prevails in the state’s apparatus, the collapse of public services and infrastructure, and the economic decline of Iraq and its transformation into a poor country despite the large sources that it possesses, it almost makes it a failed state. (According to UN estimates, in 2020 the poverty rate in Iraq will reach 40%).
All of these factors, especially political and security instability, have been identified from any opportunities for foreign investment and services and development programs, which have increased the economic contraction and blockage of the horizon before the emerging Iraqi generations. As the increase in unemployment rates, lack of job opportunities, and deteriorating economic conditions in the Nineveh Plain is one of the strong pressure factors.
The popular demonstrations that have continued since October 2019 are a reaction to the political, security, and economic conditions.
Here again, religious and national minorities are the most affected, and this is again reflected in the increase in immigration.
Fourth: The lack of a citizenship state, even though Iraq is historically a homeland of many religions, sects, and nationalities, and although Iraqi religious and national minorities are the oldest and they are the original citizens of Iraq and belong to it before the current Muslim and Arab majority, but the Iraqi state, especially the current one, is not a citizen-state that guarantees equality, justice, and dignity for its children, regardless of their identity and religious or national privacy.
The Iraqi constitution, and formal and societal daily practices and legislation that establish and reflect religious and national discrimination.
Current Iraq is a religious state that adopts Islamic law in various fields, which in daily life also creates a single religious and cultural character that imposes itself on non-Muslim minorities.
This grows a sense of discrimination among the people of these minorities and reinforces the feeling of alienation for home.
Fifth: The rise and legitimacy of the religious state in the constitution, legislation, and practice have weakened social cohesion among the components of Iraq. It also created a community environment that embraced radical Islamic terrorist organizations.
With the crimes committed by ISIS against non-Muslim minorities and the participation of the Sunni community incubating ISIS thinking and organization in these crimes, this fabric is torn as there is a lack of confidence between these components, especially among the non-Muslim minorities towards the Muslim majority.
The crisis of mistrust increased with the failure of the Iraqi government to give messages and reassurances to these minorities to their future at home and that they are partners in it and in its future, as the government’s commitment to non-Muslim minorities exceeded only some statements and words without translating into programs and plans of action, whether at the level of legislation to address memory and the achievement of transitional justice or reconstruction and development programs in the areas of these minorities.
This neglect and marginalization of ISIS victims by the Iraqi government has deepened wounds, a sense of discrimination, and doubts about the future.
Sixth: One of the most important challenges that Christians face on the ground is the threat of a programmed demographic change in the Nineveh Plain, whether from the Sunni Arabs as well as in Telkeif district (less than 30 of the total of hundreds of Christian families who lived in this Chaldean Christian city did not return to the city of Telkeif. Or from the Shabaks Shiites in the center of the Bartilla area today and with a future extension to Qaraqosh, which is the largest Christian city in Iraq.
Demographic change is practiced daily, whether at the administration level in terms of administrative appointments in government departments or at the level of the economy where Iranian funding supports the Shabak Shiites economy or in terms of the urban expansion allocated to the network, all with protection and security and military cover from  Shiites militias, and with cover and political support from the government federalism in Baghdad, in addition to creating pressure and cultural community.
The Christians of the Nineveh Plain in Telkeif, Bartilla, and Hamdaniya (Qaraqosh) are losing the lands.
With the attempt to control the volumetric institutions and change the management in them to confiscate decisions in favor of a specific class and to serve the agendas of these parties (the Head Officer of Hamdaniya University changed, the department officials changed from Christians and Yezidis with less efficient employees from Shabak, Muslims, and others).

Iraqi Christians’ Hope

We might be helpless but we are never hopeless

Christian Assyrians, regardless of their ethnic nomenclature and church affiliation, are indigenous people of Mesopotamia, the Iraq of today, and they had, throughout history, a distinguished role that surpassed the country’s borders to have a significant share to serve various aspects of humanity among which would be extending bridges, communication, and dialogue on ideology, culture, and science between East and West.
Their existence is threatened today because of what they were and still are subjected to of well-planned campaign aimed to eradicate their existence from the Iraqi national memory and physically remove them from the land of their ancestors utilizing different means starting with the constitution to legislation to curricula to religious bigotry and not ending in systematic individual and collective physical removal.
Today, the requirement to protect their existence in their homeland surpasses their capacity, therefore that protection becomes a collective national and governmental responsibility at the level of the state of Iraq, as well as the international responsibility because what they are subjected to is a violation of international treaties set forth to protect human, social, and minority rights.
Today, the Assyrian Christians, after becoming a marginalized minority in their homeland, live on the hope of a future that will guarantee justice and dignity, for they, regardless of what they went through, still believe in that hope.
We, Mesopotamians Assyrian Christians in Mesopotamia might be helpless but never hopeless.
However, it is a conditional hope.
Let us keep our moral commitment in supporting and practicing the actions on the ground to:

Keep The Hope Alive.

Duhok, 01^st April 2020

Assyrian New Year 6769

On 31 November and 1 December, CAPNI headquarter in Duhok hosted the fifth annual partners roundtable meeting, where 17 representatives of 12 partner organizations and churches from Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway and UK participated (names of participating partners at the end of the post), while a number of other partners apologized due to prior commitments.
The agenda of the meeting on its first day included a presentation on CAPNI supporting departments (human resources, finance, logistics, monitoring and evaluation) and the program sectors (Eastern Christianity, community development, health, education, advocacy). CAPNI director, Father Emmanuel Youkhana, gave a presentation on the current situation in Iraq, with a focus on the situation of minorities, the challenges they face and the needs required for them.

While the agenda of the second day included an open discussion on the importance of the organization and the continuous need for its work and programs to serve vulnerable communities, followed by a detailed presentation of the organization’s work strategy for the next three years (2023-2025), and then CAPNI finance manager gave a detailed presentation with figures and numbers of the financial situation of the organization in the operational and programmatic field and the challenges faced by the organization.
On both days, detailed discussions, interventions, suggestions and recommendations from partners were held on all the topics raised.

The meeting resulted in an action plan for the organization to develop its performance in the operational and programmatic aspects.
It is noteworthy that the meeting, in addition to its importance in terms of deep learning of CAPNI work and participating in its evaluation and development, provides a good opportunity for partners to know about the work of each of them in terms of size and type of activity, and this is part of the transparency that CAPNI is committed to partners and beneficiaries.

Hosting the meeting in Duhok was also an opportunity for partners to get acquainted with the organization’s members, their daily work and the atmosphere of the organization, in addition to getting to know directly the beneficiaries of the programs and activities.
It is noteworthy that this is the fifth roundtable meeting of the partners, which was first launched in 2017, as it was hosted by the Bavarian Lutheran Church in Germany, then Misereor hosted the second meeting in the city of Aachen – Germany in 2018, while the subsequent two meetings were conducted virtually due to Corona pandemic.

In addition to the two days of the meeting, the partners program, which extended to Friday 6th December, included several activities, meetings and field visits, where many projects implemented by CAPNI were visited, and the beneficiary communities and families met, such as Nahla, Faysh Khabour, Sapna area, and others, in addition to an open discussion meeting with the youth, as well as a visit to the various church references in Ankawa.

Names Of Participant Partners (Alphabetically)

1. Caritas International – Germany
2. Christlicher Hilfsbund im Orient – Germany
3. Embrace the Middle East – UK
4. Evangelical Church in Central Germany
5. Evangelical Lutheran Church in Bavaria – Germany
6. Evangelical Lutheran Church in North Germany
7. Evangelical Lutheran Church in Wuerttemberg – Germany
8. Evangelical Reformed Church in Zurich – Switzerland
9. Lutheran World Federation – Switzerland
10. Stefanus Alliance Inernational – Norway
11. Swedish Church Relief

And SAT7 TV as honor guest

Fleeing ISIS

Aramaic-Speaking Christians in the Nineveh Plains after ISIS

Paper By

Archimandrite Emanuel Youkhana
Duhok, Iraqi Kurdistan

Archimandrite Emanuel Youkhana

Excluding the Armenians[1] and some small groups of converts[2], the Iraqi Christians are the indigenous people of Iraq. Their roots go back thousands of years before Christianity in the lands of Mesopotamia.

In other words, I believe the Iraqi Christians are the true native people of Iraq, being descendants of the ancient Assyrians and Babylonians. The Aramaic-speaking Christians (Assyrians, Chaldeans, Chaldo-Assyrians) are not a new Christian community ‘evangelised’ by western missionaries, as is the case in many African and East Asian Christian communities.

Christian religion began to come to Iraq already in the first two centuries after Christ under the rule of the Parthians, ‘who were open to the practice of different religions and seem to have tolerated the introduction of Christianity into their empire.’[3] Aramaic Christians in Iraq and their churches go back to the first generations who adopted Christianity through Jesus Christ’s apostles. Their Christianity is older than European Christianity, and their existence in Iraq predates Islam in Iraq.

The ethnic and cultural identity of Iraqi Christians

The Iraqi Christians belong to various churches and denominations, but they share a common ethnicity and culture. They speak the eastern dialect of Syriac, which is the local language that descended from Aramaic, the language spoken by Jesus Christ.

However, many Iraqi Christians who lived in big cities such as Baghdad, Mosul and Basra long ago abandoned and forgot their mother language and began speaking Arabic, due to political pressure and persecution. Nevertheless, they still believe they are not Arabs and have therefore kept their mother tongue, Syriac, as the mains language of their religious rituals.

Syriac, like other living languages, has different dialects. Each dialect has its particular character depending on the demography and surrounding circumstances. The map of Syriac dialects does not necessarily synchronise with the various churches of Iraqi Christians. This means that followers of different churches may speak the same dialect, while followers of one church might speak different dialects. However, speaking and understanding among these people is normal and easy because the minor linguistic differences of various dialects only involve pronunciation.

The Iraqi Christians share the same customs and social traditions which reflect their unified identity—Christian principles and values that have been in place since they embraced Christianity in its very early stages in Mesopotamia at the hands of Mar (Saint) Thomas (one of the Twelve Apostles), Mar Addai, and Mar Mary, two of the Seventy Apostles.[4]

Despite the accumulated historical diversity and schisms in their theological views and churches, the Iraqi Christians intermarry between their Christian denominations. And despite the multiple names ascribed to this cultural and ethnic entity in the past, they firmly believe in the unity of their ethnicity, culture, and destiny.

Demographic Distribution Of Iraqi Christians

Based on the historical claim that the Iraqi Assyrian-Chaldean-Syriac Christians are the indigenous people of Iraq, it is notable that their primary residences are the country plains around the historical capital of the Assyrian Empire of Nineveh (now Mosul).

Due to colonialism and the expansion of Islam (Arabs coming from the south and Kurds from the north and northeast), the whole region was eventually controlled by Muslims, forcing Christians to become a religious minority struggling to survive.

Many Christian towns in the region, such as Alqosh, Telkeif, Bartilla, Zakho, and Mangesh, still exist. Historical evidence indicates churches as well as Christian communities had a presence in big cities in Northern Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan, such as Mosul and Erbil. Christians, however, also exist in other big cities such as Baghdad, Kirkuk and Basra. Their roots go back to earlier Assyrian and Christian communities; social and economic factors caused Christians to move to these cities to seek a better life. The Iraqi Christians have lived in Baghdad and Kirkuk since the times of the Abbasids, Mongolians, and Ottomans.[5]

Other political and security reasons played important roles in encouraging migration to large cities. From the 1960s to the 1980s, migration to the large Iraqi cities, especially Baghdad, has significantly increased because their historical places of habitation and villages in Iraqi Kurdistan, particularly in the regions of Duhok and Erbil, became sites of military battles between the Kurdish revolution and central government troops.

The pace of migration escalated, particularly after the Baath regime took power in Iraq in 1968 and began adopting a policy of burning the land. The policy of destroying the Assyrian and Kurdish villages in the north, lasted from 1974 to 1988 and resulted in the obliteration of 4,000 villages, among them some 120 Assyrian Christian villages and the destruction of more than 60 ancient churches. The regime also practiced ethnic cleansing by deporting thousands of Assyrians and Kurds to other places, replacing them with Arabs in the former Assyrian/Kurdish homes and villages. However, beginning in 1991 with the liberation of the Iraqi Kurdistan region, a significant movement began to return and rebuild the life in the destroyed villages. This movement increased Saddam’s regime fell in 2003.

Therefore, we may describe the Christian demography in Iraq as follows:

I- The geopolitical demography, in terms of population and lands (towns, townships, villages) exists in two regions:

1- Iraqi Kurdistan region: particularly in the governorates of Dohuk and Erbil where around 120 Christian towns, townships and villages exist.

2- Nineveh Plains: where a substantial Christian population exists (to be introduced in detail in the sections that follow).

II- Christians in the big, mixed cities of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah have, has faced real threats, especially in Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul, because of a systematic anti-Christian terror campaign and ongoing religious cleansing in many parts of these cities.

This existence, which has survived over many centuries, might be extinguished if circumstances are not changed.

Iraqi Christian Demography

The current Iraqi administrative structure is composed of 18 governorates (or provinces), each composed of districts (the governorate centre is also always a district centre) which, in turn, are composed of a couple of sub-districts, to which the townships and villages belong.

The difference between the two aforementioned demographic types (i.e. in the Kurdish Region of Iraq and the Nineveh Plains, and other parts of Iraq) is that in both the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI) and the Nineveh Plains, people have a historical connection to the land.

This enables Christians to preserve, practice, and improve their collective identity and to have a political and administrative role in the planning and decision-making of these territories. In addition, social and cultural entities/services can operate and add value to the community. Whereas, in other parts of Iraq, Christians only represent a tiny part of the roughly seven million population of Baghdad or several thousand scattered amongst the millions of Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk.

The Christian presence in KRI has some important differences with the Nineveh Plains. The existence in KRI is mostly in rural villages (over 100) and in the big cities like Duhok, Ankawa (the sub-district in Erbil), Zakho and others; most of those villages are not mixed, i.e. all their people are Christian, while only a couple of them are mixed with Yazidis and/or Muslims, such as Sorka, Sorya, and others.

The size of the villages ranges from the small (up to 15 families) to the large (less than 100 families) and even to the largest of them, where the quantity reaches 250 families. The Christian villages in KRI are very exceptional in the region’s history.

The Christians have never returned to the villages and regions from which they were forced to flee, e.g. Hakari, Tur Abdin (in modern Turkey), Urmia (in North Iran) and in Khabour (Syria). Only in Iraqi Kurdistan have the deported Christians gone back to their home villages and rebuilt their lives.

The Christians in the Nineveh Plains mainly exist in semi-large populated townships and towns. In many cases, Christian towns in the Nineveh Plains are district centres (e.g. Hamdaniya) or sub-districts (Bartilla, Alqosh).

There are no Christian towns or villages in Iraq south of the Nineveh Plains to the Saudi and Kuwaiti borders, nor to the eastern and western Iraqi borders. This illustrates important current and future concerns of Iraqi Christians amid geopolitical circumstances. It also poses new questions on the structure and future of Iraq and neighbouring countries.

Another important factor in considering the region’s long-term borders is that the Christian Assyrian demography in KRI and Nineveh Plains has the same demography in Northeast Syria and Southeast Turkey (Tur Abdin), similar to the Kurdish demography in KRI which continues the Kurdish demography in Iran, Turkey and Syria.

Figures for Christian Demography in Iraq[6]

The Census of 1977

Iraq, like all other Arab and Islamic states with many ethnic and religious minorities, lacks transparency regarding statistics and figures of minorities and their political, religious, social and cultural conditions. However, with the fall of the Saddam regime, many secret documents, statistics and reports were released and became available for researchers.
The Political Department in the General Security Directorate, the former regime’s high office concerned with Iraqi religious minorities, noted in the Iraqi census of 1977: The results of the latest census of 1977 show Muslims in Iraq are the majority of the population. Their number is 11,474,293 persons; this is around 97% of the overall Iraqi population, which is 11,862,620. Therefore, the other four religious groups (Christians, Yazidis, Mandeans, and Jews) are religious minorities in Iraq. Their numbers are as follows: (Christians) 253,478 i.e., 2.14% of the Iraqi population; (Yazidis) 102,191 i.e., 0.86%, (Mandeans) 15, 937 i.e., 0.14% and (Jews) 381 i.e., 0.01%.
However, the study’s most dangerous indicator is the continuous decrease in the annual population growth of Iraqi Christians.  The paragraph titled ‘Population growth indicators between religious groups in Iraq 1947–1977’ notes:
The population growth average between Christians was very close to that of Muslims for the period 1947–1957. The average was more than 3% per year. We notice the rapid decrease in growth to 1.6% between 1957 and 1965. Despite the fact that this is a very small average, it continued to decrease rapidly to reach 0.73% per year between 1965 and 1977. This is a very low average and is close to the population growth average in developed countries.
According to Operation World in the United Kingdom, the Christian population’s annual growth in Iraq in 2002 was negative: -0.9%!

Iraqi Christian Population Annual Growth

Administrative and Geographic Origin of Nineveh Plains

The term ‘Nineveh Plains’ had never been used in administrative or geographical contexts the way it is used now in the Iraqi official documentation or administrative structures. After the Saddam regime was toppled in 2003, ‘Nineveh Plains’ emerged in the Iraqi political and media discussions and hence by the international media.

The term was created and developed because the plains became a sanctuary for Christians fleeing violence and organised terrorism which targeted them in the cities under Iraqi central government jurisdiction, such as Mosul, Baghdad, Basra, Anbar, and other areas in which Christians existed. In contrast, the Peshmerga forces and Asayesh security forces who receive their orders from Kurdistan region, had created on the Nineveh Plains, a stable atmosphere, except for some rare security breaches. Also, the Nineveh Plains had a historical Christian presence; for many IDPs, it had been their homeland before they migrated to bigger cities to seek better education and employment opportunities. Therefore, most IDPs in the Nineveh Plains after 2003 had simply returned to where they originally came from. The same applied to Yazidis— particularly those who living in Mosul and who sought security in the Yazidi towns and villages in the Nineveh Plains. Having the Plains transformed into a haven for Christians and Yazidis transformed the ‘Nineveh Plains’ into a term indicating an administrative area secured for minorities.
Despite the near universal acceptance of the term ‘Nineveh Plains’ and its constitutive administrative units—including Telkeif, Hamdaniya, Sheikhan districts along with their sub-districts and villages, and the Baashiqa sub-district that is under the jurisdiction of the central district of Mosul (Mosul city, the capital of the Nineveh governorate)—the geography and its administrative formation has been debated since 1991 because of changes in administration and security control over it, or some parts of it.
Nineveh Plains administrative composition[7]:

• District of Telkeif, whose centre (capital) is the city of Telkeif, has two sub-districts, Alqosh, Fayda and Wana, and many villages.
• District of Hamdaniya, whose centre is the city of Baghdeda (Qaraqosh or Hamdaniya), has two sub-districts, Bartilla and Nimrod, and many villages.
• District of Sheikhan, whose centre is the city of Ain-Safni (Sheikhan), has the sub-districts Zelkan, Qasrok, Baadrah and Kalakji.
• Sub-district of Baashiqa, which is under the district of Mosul city centre.

The cultural, religious and ethnic composition[8]:
Nineveh Plains, considered Iraq’s most religiously, nationally, and culturally diverse area, contrasts with other, homogenous Iraqi cities.  The Nineveh Plains contains Muslims, Christians, Yazidis and Kaka’aies, the latter of whom, despite being registered in the Iraqi identity directorate as Muslims, maintain their unique religious identity. Denominationally, the Nineveh Plains contains Sunni and Shia Muslims, as well as Catholic, Orthodox and Church of the East Christians. Arabs, Kurds, Chaldeans, Syriacs, and Assyrians live in the plains (the term ‘Suryaye’ is widely used to refer to Chaldeans, Syriacs, and Assyrians). The Shabaks, considered one of the mains ethnic/cultural groups of the Nineveh Plains,  are mostly Shia Muslims with some Sunni Muslims, yet they dispute their national identity; some consider themselves to be Kurds, while others identify as Arabs. The third fraction presents themselves as being just Shabaks.  The Arabic, Kurdish and Syriac languages are spoken on the Nineveh Plains, in addition to the language of the Shabak.

Economic Resources

The ‘Nineveh Plains’ includes the area’s basic economic resources of agriculture and animal husbandry, in addition to some food industries. Along with widespread cultivation of wheat and barley, Baghdeda (Qaraqosh) has the basic production of poultry and calves for Nineveh and neighbouring governorates. Baashiqa and its surroundings produce olive oil, Tahini, pickles and related products.
Given the area’s proximity to Mosul, the economic resources also include jobs related to small-scale industries as well as factories producing decorative stones. The Nineveh Plains is located between two mains roads, one of which connects Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, and Erbil, the KRG capital. The second main road connects Mosul with Turkey through Duhok—hence the areas close to the borders of Mosul have now become important economic centres.

Religious Tourism[9]:
Despite the lack of infrastructure and weak support from the relevant federal and local governments, the Nineveh Plains have played a big role in religious tourism, with the potential to grow exponentially, since it includes many shrines and religious sites of all different religions.
The Plains’ many important Christian monasteries include:

1. Hurmezd monastery in Alqosh, which is now run by the Chaldean Church (it was historically established and developed as one of the Church of the East’s monasteries).
2. Matthew monastery in Mount Maqloub, which is one of the most ancient monasteries of the Orthodox Church.
3. Behnam Monastery in Namroud, which is the one and only monastery that belongs to the Syriac Catholic Church in Iraq.

Important religious shrines include the Prophet Nahum Shrine in Alqosh, which was formerly a synagogue and remains an important site for Jews. It is believed to be where the prophet Nahum is buried. Furthermore, the most sacred shrine in Yazidism, the Shrine of Sheikh Aadi in Lalish Valley, is located in the Nineveh Plains, in addition to other shrines in Yazidis towns also in the plains. For Shi’ite Muslims, the shrine of Imam Ridha, who was one of the twelve imams of Shi’ism, is located in the Nineveh Plains.
In addition to these religious sites, the Nineveh Plains has many archaeological sites such as Mesopotamia, Dour Sharokeen, and Nimrud (which are two Assyrian capitals), as well as being the location of Khanas, where the winged bulls (‘Lamassus’) were produced and shipped to Mosul via the Khousar river.
Let´s have a closer look to the Christian Demography in Nineveh Plain and its Administrative Geography.[10] The Christian presence in the Nineveh Plains owes its strength to its historical roots, which go back to pre-Christian times, since the plains surrounds the city of Nineveh (modern-day Mosul)—one of the most important capitals of the Assyrian Empire—as well as Dour Sharoukeen (modern-day Khorsobad), which was also one of the ancient Assyrian capitals. The Christian presence, therefore, is the most important demographic continuation for the Assyrian national existence.
A further strength of the Christian demography in Nineveh Plains is that they make up most of the key town and administrative centres that form the Nineveh Plains. Christians make up around 95% of Baghdeda (Qaraqosh, Capital of Hamdaniya district) and used to be the majority in Telkeif District just before the mass Chaldean migration to the United States of America because of an Arabisation policy; the city now has a majority of Sunni Arabs.
This also applies to the purely Christian city of Alqosh. The city of Bartilla once had a majority Christian population before the organised demographic change of the early 1980s. Now the surrounding Shabaks have increasing political and economic capabilities. The Christians in Baashiqa make up around 25% of the population with the Yazidis as the majority with 60%. The Christian demography in the Nineveh Plains suffers a key weakness of semi-detachment from neighbouring Christians with no connection on the ground among one another, in contrast to the Yazidis and Shabaks.

Christian Churches Diversity

 The Nineveh Plains has a diversity of traditional Christian apostolic churches, except the Armenian Church. These include the Syriac Orthodox church, Syriac Catholic Church, Chaldean Catholic church, Assyrian Church of the East, and Ancient Church of the East. The density of these churches varies as they have different locations in the Plains’ geography.
For instance: the Syriac Catholic Church, which some consider to be the largest church of the plains, is within the city of Baghdeda (Qaraqosh) while the Syriac Orthodox church has its followers in Bartilla, Baashiqa, Bahzani, Baghdeda, and the villages of Mergi, Lfaf and Maghara on the foot of Mount Maqlob and which are in the St. Matthew diocese.
However, the Chaldean church, which others claim as the largest church in the plains,  is situated in the northern parts of the Nineveh Plains,  in the cities of Telkeif, Alqosh through Batnaya, Baqofa, Telsquf, and in Jambour, Bandawaye, Sheikhan, Karmles (south of the plain). While the Assyrian Church of the East is present in small villages near Alqosh such as Sharafiya, or on the road connecting Alqosh to Sheikhan such as Ein Baqri, Dashqotan, Karanjo, Perozawa, Garmawa and Sheikhan; the inhabitants of these villages have roots from Hakari Assyrians (south of Turkey) who fled their country to Iraq during the Ottoman Genocide in WW1 against the Christians of the Ottoman Empire: Armenians, Assyrians Syriacs, and Greek. The Assyrians of Rekan area of Heesh, Estip and Maydan villages in Duhok governorate settled in Telkeif in the mid-1970s after being deported by the former Baath regime.[11]

The importance of the Nineveh Plains for Christians

The Nineveh Plains is important the Christians of Iraq for many reasons. The foremost include:

• It represents their deeply-rooted national and cultural identity going back to the centuries before Christ. They are the heirs of the Assyrians of the Assyrian empire whose mains capital was Nineveh (current Mosul). The plains encompasse other Assyrian capitals and cities such as Nimrud, Khorsabad, Khans, and others.
• With the great and continuous decline of Christian demography in Iraq, the Nineveh Plains is one of only two concentrated areas of Christians. (The other area is the governorate of Duhok in the Kurdistan region and some areas of Erbil, specifically Ankawa.) This important demographic presence in the Nineveh Plains has an additional important power component inextricably linked with Christian demography in Duhok governorate. This makes them vital, especially if the Nineveh Plains joins the Kurdistan region in the near or medium term, because this makes interaction between the Nineveh Plains and Duhok vital and influential in the long-term strategy of connecting with the presence of Assyrian Syriac Christians in northeast Syria and southeast Turkey (Tur Abdin).
• The Christian community in the Nineveh Plains has the economic resources of the vast land and the agricultural, industrial, and commercial establishments that have grown and developed cumulatively and have not been affected by the political unrest and conflict in Iraq (pre-ISIS). The Nineveh Plains, unlike the Christian villages and towns of Duhok, has not been subjected to displacement and destruction, which created an atmosphere of local stability sufficient for developing these resources.
• The Nineveh Plains, like the whole Christian presence, has many economic and academic capabilities. This makes investment in these resources for economic development in the Nineveh Plains possible and also makes them, especially in the parts of the plains that includes Yazidis and Christians (from Alqosh and Telsquf to Baashiqa and Bahzani), an environment suitable for economic activities that cannot be achieved in the rest of Iraqi denominated by Islamic environment, especially the Sunni and Shia Arabs.
• The Nineveh Plains, unlike all other Iraqi regions (except for the city of Kirkuk), is characterised by a diversity of religious, ethnic and cultural minorities without a specific identity holding a majority. This allows all its minority components, including Christians, to play a greater role in political, administrative, economic, and community activities in the plains. It is the right environment for Christians to play their role as a bridge between these different minorities.
• The Christian presence in the Nineveh Plains is characterised by its concentration and heavy weight in the centres of the administrative units, which enabled the Christians to assume important administrative positions in the administrative units of the Nineveh Plains (the mayor of Telkeif, Hamdaniyah districts, and mayor of Alqosh sub-district).

Nineveh Plains under Ba’ath regime

 After the Ba’ath regime seized power by a military coup in June 1968, to some extent, it formed a secular regime with Arabian fascist policies imposed on non-Arab people such as the Kurds, Assyrians, and Turkmen. It later shifted to add an Islamic dimension to its rhetoric, practices, and policies, especially while the Iraqi-Iran war was still waging, then followed by the First Gulf War (Battle for Kuwait) led by the USA, and then the long economic siege imposed on Iraq.

The Nineveh Plains, the only area of Iraq without Muslims and Arabs as the majority of its inhabitants, became a target of the regime’s Arabianisation and Islamisation policies. Since the 1970s, in parallel with forcibly displacing the Kurds and Assyrians from Iraqi Kurdistan followed by the collapse of the Kurdistan revolution in 1975 with the signing of the Algerian treaty and the Arabisation of large swaths of the Kurdish region (for example, the Slevani area in Duhok governorate), the regime adopted the policy of Arabising the Nineveh Plains and particularly its Christian territory. This policy expanded during the Iraqi-Iranian war by laws granting properties to Arab civil servants and military personnel in the Christian plains of Nineveh in Telkeif, Baghdeda (Qaraqosh), Bartilla, and other areas. Furthermore, these practices were followed by Islamising policies of building mosques in these areas and villages despite the light presence of Muslim families there.  However, the regime intentionally neglected providing health, economy and education services to the the Nineveh Plains leaving it dependent on services provided in Mosul and hence under the Islamic Arabian influence. Also, the regime had tightened its grip on Nineveh Plains through its security agents despite the plains never any sort of demonstrations or opposition to the regime’s policy even when the Iraqi revolution broke out in the aftermath of Kuwait war. Many Christian young people from the Nineveh Plains escaped the compulsory military service during the Iraqi-Iranian war by fleeing to Iranian territory through Kurdistan and then seeking asylum in the west. The same applied to many Christian families who fled their villages in the Nineveh Plains after the end of the Iraqi-Iranian war and as a result of the international sanctions imposed on Iraq; they sought asylum in neighbouring countries and then in the west.[12] 

Pre-ISIS Nineveh Plains 2003-2014

The collapse of the Saddam regime in April 2003 was not just a regime change like other coups that took place in the Middle East and elsewhere. Saddam’s totalitarian regime had held an iron grip on individuals and families of Iraqi community, and hence on all of the Iraqi state institutions; this resulted in the state itself collapsing, not just the regime. As a consequence, Iraq after 2003 was transformed into a territory of political parties with their loyal militias that imposed their own rule of law in particular areas.

The weak and scattered minorities without influential political and military establishments and the wealth of the Christians and Mandeans made them an easy, attractive target in the mid-south Iraq area by jihadist Sunni and Shia militias, as well as by organised crime gangs. The Shlomo Documentation Organization stated that 1,174 Christians including 14 clergymen have been killed between 2003 and 2014 (pre-ISIS) in territories under the Iraqi central government. In the terrorist assault on The Lady of Survival Church in Baghdad on 31 October 2010, 53 Christians were martyred while attending church service. There were 114 attacks on churches in Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, Anbar, some of which have been targeted more than once. Christians were also kidnapped for ransom. [13]

All of these systematic assaults based on religious identity left the Christians with no choice but to flee to safer areas on the Nineveh Plains and Kurdistan region, or apply for resettlement visas to western countries. Some cities, such as Ramadi, Khalidiya and Habaniya, no longer have any Christians, whereas their presence has considerably decreased in the key cities of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. Baghdad had an estimated 250,000 Christians before 2003, this number has decreased to approximately 40,000. Around 16 churches have been shut down in Baghdad. Therefore, Christians fled to Nineveh Plains as a safe territory for the following reasons:

• The stable security situation in the area which had been under the command of Peshmerga forces and Kurdistan Asayesh (security personnel).
• Almost all of the Christians had family roots in the Nineveh Plains, but left it years ago to seek better financial conditions in larger cities.
• The plains had a generally Christian-embracing atmosphere.
• The Arabic language taught in schools and spoken at official directorates and local markets made it easier for them to integrate. Whereas in Kurdistan, they would face difficulty with a Kurdish language they had never studied or spoken.

From the early days after April 2003, there had been multiple displacement waves to Nineveh Plain; for instance, in 2004, 2006, and 2010. The Yazidi community, like the Christians, also fled the larger cities, especially Mosul city in which no Yazidi person remained when ISIS took control. They went to Nineveh Plains and the Yazidi community complexes. This massive displacement to the plains created a huge pressure on the economic market as well as the infrastructure.

The table below from a survey conducted by Christian Aid Program – Nohadra – Iraq CAPNI, is a sample of the number and percentage of displaced Christian families who fled Iraqi cities to the Christian towns and villages in Nineveh Plains (The figures are from October 2006):

So, for every three families the fourth is a displaced one!!!
The percentage is even more than in the governorate of Dohuk.
Some people incorrectly assumed that ISIS appeared, expanded, and controlled two-thirds of Iraqi territory including Nineveh Plains in summer 2014 as the result of ‘cross-border terrorism’ (as described by an Iraqi diplomat at a conference in the United Nation’s sub-HQ on February 2018 in Vienna, Austria). However, ISIS had been present and growing with its jihadist ideology in the Sunni Arab community of Mosul city and surrounding territory. It resulted from the inflammatory rhetoric of the Baath regime’s ‘Faith Campaign’ in 1996 that depicted the sanctions and its health and economic consequences on Iraqi living conditions as part of a western ‘crusade’ against Islamic countries.[14] Mosul city and the governorate of Nineveh have been an Arab Sunni stronghold with deeply political Islamic roots. Because of its Arabic ideology and its well-known stances against non-Arab components of Kurds and Assyrians, it formed, alongside the governorate of Anbar, a fertile environment for Sunni Jihadist organisations. The ISIS was publicly present in Mosul city for years until they controlled it completely and imposed their Sharia (laws) on the Mosul community and everyday life including the Christians.

Churches used to regularly pay money to the jihadi organisations in return for their own safety. These organisations pressured Christians to not show crosses or ring church bells. Christians also had to pay to protect their supermarkets and economic projects. The religious rhetoric along with education became jihadist rhetoric. The lifestyle, culture, and social environment in Mosul all came under the grip of Islamic Sharia.

These factors, along with the absence of the rule of law, created space to target the Christians, their churches, and their properties. More clergy were martyred in Mosul than all other Iraqi cities combined. These terrorist acts forced the Christians of Mosul to leave the city seeking security. Nineveh Plains was one of these areas where Christians from Mosul and the rest of Iraq headed to, something that created service and economic pressure on the host community in the plains.

The tense atmosphere of Mosul resulted in the Nineveh Plains communities fearing to connect with or seek services in Mosul and seeking alternatives. For example, the targeting of university buses that had been transporting students from Nineveh Plains to Mosul University on 2 May 2010 was perceived as an explicit threat. The jihadist ideology expanded to the Sunni Arabian community in Nineveh Plain; this could be explicitly witnessed through religious rhetoric on mosque podiums as well the lifestyle atmosphere. Once ISIS controlled Telkeif, many in the Sunni Arab community joined the insurgents and looted Christian, Yazidi, and Shia properties.

Nineveh Plains under ISIS 

When ISIS gained control over the city of Mosul in June 2014, the Nineveh Plains, along with the governorates of Iraqi Kurdistan, turned into a safe haven for Mosul Christians and other non-Muslim, and non-Sunni communities fleeing from ISIS. Most observers and analysts believed that ISIS would, after Mosul, go to Baghdad through the governorates and Sunni territories.

However, for reasons that are still unclear, on 3 August, ISIS advanced to the Yazidi-dominated Sinjar region where it committed the terrible crimes of genocide, sexual slavery, and kidnapping, as well as destroying public and private properties. Sinjar was a warning for the Nineveh Plains, to which ISIS headed on 6 August, and so the Nineveh Plains gained a three-day advantage in which its inhabitants were able to escape to the governorates of Duhok and Erbil. When ISIS moved towards Erbil, the coalition air force intervened and stopped their advance so that the front lines were between the Peshmerga and ISIS. The lines remained unchanged until the retaking of the Nineveh Plains in the summer of 2016.

It is a painful coincidence that on the night of August 6, 81 years ago (1933), the Semile massacre began against the Christian Assyrians and its memory remains stuck in the collective memory of the people, and the wound is renewed again on 6 August 2014.

Thus, the Nineveh Plains, for the first time in its history, was completely emptied from its Christians, Yazidis, Shia Shabaks and, and groups of Sunnis Shabaks. Most Arabs and Sunni Shabaks in Telkeif, Salamiya, Nimrod and Fadhiliya regions remained coexisting under and with ISIS. When front lines became stable, people returned to cities, towns, and villages such as Alqosh, Khatara, Jambur, Busan, Telsquf which had been abandoned out of fear of ISIS. In August 2014, Telsquf remained ten days under ISIS until it was liberated by the Peshmerga.

The occupation of the Nineveh Plains caused tremendous damage to personal and public properties, in addition to religious and archaeological sites and buildings, as well as infrastructure, shops, agricultural and industrial facilities, and others. The short and long-term effects of ISIS control of the Nineveh Plains have gone beyond the enormous physical and economic destruction that requires decades to rehabilitate. Physical destruction has moral and psychological effects and harms individual and collective human dignity. It also affected the links between the community components, especially among Christians and Yazidis, on the one hand, and Muslims, specifically the Sunnis, on the other. Restoring these damaged links, among other things, are the challenges of return to the Nineveh Plains after ISIS.

Post-ISIS Nineveh Plains 2016: Regaining Control on Nineveh Plain

 I personally hesitate to use the term ‘liberation’ from ISIS for this term contains many meanings which remains incomplete. I would use the term ‘retaking’; it refers to the reality on the ground. What has been achieved is no more than regaining security, military, and administrative control over the areas once under ISIS.
The Kurdistan Peshmerga forces had been on the thousand-kilometre frontline with ISIS stretched from the Syrian border in northwest to Diyala in the mid-east of Iraq. Therefore, retaking control over areas under ISIS from Sinjar to Kirkuk through Nineveh Plains should have been launched from Kurdistan territory, and Peshmerga forces should have participated in military operations. Despite the political conflict between Baghdad and Erbil along with their future ambitions some sort of agreement between Baghdad and Erbil concerning territory control after the retaking phase was necessary. This sort of agreement, some believed to have been American-sponsored, allowed  the relaunching of military operations to defeat ISIS and regain control over the areas they once held.[15]

In Nineveh Plains,  the Peshmerga forces would retake south of Mosul Dam then west to the south of Batnaya, Baashiqa to further west of Hamdaniya, while the Iraqi Army on the other side along with the Public Mobilisations Units (Alhashid) would retake the rest of the areas along with Mosul city till the Syrian border. Hence, the security and military control over Nineveh Plains shifted from being purely under Peshmerga and Asayesh control before ISIS to an area divided administratively between KRI and Iraqi federal government.

With the retaking of Nineveh Plains, the villages of Baqofa, Telsquf up to Alqosh, Baashiqa, and Bahzani up to St. Matthew were under Peshmerga jurisdiction. Whereas Telkeif, Bartilla, Karmless and Baghdeda (Qaraqosh) became under the control of the Iraqi Army and the Public Mobilisation Units (Alhashid). The Christians in Nineveh Plains had greatly feared this scattering and tearing apart between two security administrations and two constitutional administrations.
Taking back the Nineveh Plain, especially the east bank of Mosul city, revealed the enormous destruction resulting from ISIS control over these areas and resulting military operations. The people of the Nineveh Plains have been under great shock of the devastation to their own properties such as houses, trade businesses, and farmland. Also damaged were the infrastructure and service units of schools, health centres, water networks, electricity, and official directorates. The ISIS even intentionally demolished the churches and religious institutions of Christians, Yazidis, and Shia.

Nineveh Plains After Kurdistan referendum

In the summer of 2017, after regaining control of the ISIS military zones, the Iraqi political scene and KRI faced a new challenge of the Kurdistan Democratic Party KDP to call for a referendum on the right to self-determination and independence of Kurdistan from Iraq. The demand for self-determination is not new to Kurdish political parties. However, in Kurdistan, this demand cannot be isolated from its consequences on regional and international stability. Hence, the call for the referendum was unanimously rejected by all countries from the neighbouring countries, influential Middle Eastern countries and European and North American powers.

From the point of view of Christians, the referendum held in the Nineveh Plains reflected the big question about the administrative subordination between Iraqi federal government and KRI. The call for the referendum and its aftermath, followed by the expansion of the Iraqi army and the militias of the Popular Mobilisation and the decline of the Peshmerga caused confusion. Displaced people were less inclined to return to their homes in the Nineveh Plains.  People identifying as Christian had been divided between the military and security administration of KRG (Baqofah, Telsquf, and the rest of the northern Nineveh Plains and the villages of Jabal Maqloub), and the region of the military and security administration of the central government administrative (Telkeif, Batnaya, Bahzani, Bartilla, Qaraqosh and Karmless).

The open question remains about reunifying the Nineveh Plains and restoring the natural, living, economic and social interaction between its regions. The complex and subjective answer is not limited to the wishes of the people of the plains, but includes interests and aspirations of Iraqi Shia, Kurdish and Sunni decisionmakers and the neighbouring countries. The Shia led by Iran and Sunni led by Saudi Arabia have turned Iraq and Syria into a conflicted arena that does not place a high priority on the interests of vulnerable minorities.

The de facto stability of Nineveh Plains encouraged more families to return home. Local and international humanitarian organisations, including United Nations organisations, helped fill the vacuum caused by the almost complete absence of the Iraqi government in reconstruction programs. (Appendix 5)
All returnees to the Plains faced significant challenges. The first and most basic challenge facing the displaced is the harm and destruction, partial or total, of their homes (see table in Appendix 4) and the looting and pillaging of all their household possessions. Families cannot deal with this challenge because their limited resources had already been exhausted during their displacement. International organisations could only partially rehabilitate the destroyed houses.[16]

The most important challenges are
Plurality of security and military forces[17]: The Peshmerga and Asayish forces in the Nineveh Plains areas under the control of KRG that offers a feeling of individual and collective safety, the Iraqi central government does not. For example, the military and security administration of the Christian- dominated areas under the control of the central government are shared with three politically affiliated militias: The Babylonian militia in Telkeif and Batnaya, the Shabaki popular mobilisation militia (Brigade 30) in Bartilla, Baashiqa, and Bahzani, and the Nineveh Plains Units in Qaraqosh and Karmless. The militias never provided stability and security for the people, and this is not expected in the Nineveh Plains.

Administrative Structure and Reference: Although the central government has officially recognised the administrative unit of the Nineveh Plains, many administrative units exist on the ground. For example, Sheikhan district, officially linked to the governorate of the Nineveh, and Alqosh sub-district, officially under Telkeif, both are practically under the authority of KRG. This duplication may not have much impact on the daily life of the Nineveh Plains people, where its impact is limited to several government departments and documents, but it is an effective challenge in any political process related to the normalisation of administrative and security conditions for the Nineveh Plains, or the application of the Iraqi Constitutional Article 140.

Political Intersections: All Iraqi political parties, with limited exceptions, have religious or sectarian affiliations. One reason might be the weak identification with the Iraqi state. The constitutional, legislative and administrative restructuring and political instability of post-2003 Iraq led to political forces using violence to achieve their demands. The plethora of political organisations active on the Nineveh Plains reflects its ethnic, religious, and sectarian diversity. These organisations seek to expand their popular base in various ways, including the misuse of security and administrative services. This puts additional strains on the daily lives of people of the area and threatens any practical programs to restore trust and peaceful coexistence among the communities.

Economic Challenges: The economic challenges of returning to the Nineveh Plains are not limited to the enormous destruction from ISIS or the accompanying military operations to regain control. Considerable medium- and long-term funding must transcend the complicated political, security and administrative situation in order to rehabilitate economic activity that ranges from small workshops to medium-sized activities (industrial and agricultural production plants) and large-scale livestock enterprises, e.g., area of Qaraqosh. This challenge is compounded by the total absence of the Iraqi state and the lack of financial resources. Funds are limited to the contributions of the already affected citizens and the humanitarian organisations operating in the region, whose limited resources cannot cover the needs.

Public-Service Challenges: the Iraqi state neglected for many decades the infrastructure and basic services on the Nineveh Plains. This neglect increased after 2003, especially with the conflict between the federal government in Baghdad and KRG. During the ISIS occupation, the deterioration of these structures and destruction increased. This has resulted in a lack of quantitative and qualitative minimum in basic sectors such as health, education, electricity, water, sanitation, and roads, which increases the burden of life for returnees.

This context shapes the challenges of rehabilitating places of worship, church-operated institutions, and service centres that include kindergartens, youth centres, welfare centres, sports and social centres. Rehabilitating worship places materially helps maintain identity and a sense of identity. Thus, the houses of worship are important in the process of return and stability. They send a message of future reassurance, which the central government has failed to do.  This reconstruction has been left to the targeted communities with limited resources or international humanitarian organisations, which usually do not rehabilitate places of worship.

Challenges of Community Coexistence: Since the establishment of the modern Iraqi state, it has not had the strong cohesion that preserves society from dissonance and conflict between its components. During most stages of the history of contemporary Iraq, the state, its political system, and its military and security tools were part of this conflict; for example, the bloody conflict with Kurds and Shias.

The rapid expansion of ISIS control over nearly two-thirds of Iraq demonstrates the lack of community cohesion. The politicians of Iraq, as well as the people of the communities targeted by ISIS, did not know that many Sunni Arabs had aligned with the ISIS and joined and participated in the terrorist operations against components of their community that shared daily life in the cities and areas controlled by ISIS.

This makes it impossible in some places and difficult in other places to expect community peaceful coexistence based on trust and mutual respect. People remember bloody, painful events in their lives. The government does not have any real program to deal with this memory and offer victims of ISIS victims their legal, moral, and material rights such as transitional justice and accountability of those involved in crimes of ISIS. It does not compensate the victims and reassure victims that what happened will not be repeated again.

The official and institutional Iraq still has not dealt with what happened as an existential threat to the social structure. So far, no national debate has been held about what happened. Why did it happen? How did it happen? How could its recurrence be prevented?

The constitution, Iraqi legislation, curricula of education, and political and religious discourse have not changed nor addressed the causes of the disaster. Hence, it is almost impossible for non-Muslim minorities victimised by ISIS to trust returning to predominantly Arab Sunni areas. For example, Christians and Yazidis find it almost too difficult to return to the city of Mosul or the city of Telkeif.

Peaceful coexistence among the communities of the Nineveh Plains is a big and growing challenge, especially with the recruitment of religious and sectarian political parties and their affiliated and influential militias in the Nineveh Plains. These political parties and militias existed even before ISIS with activities in the areas of Bartilla and Hamdaniyah by the Shia Shabak, and in Telkeif by the Sunni Arabs[18].

Post ISIS Challenges in the Nineveh Plains

While these challenges affect all ethnic, religious and sectarian components in Nineveh Plains, the impact on the Christian community in the post-ISIS period relates to future Christian demography, which is threatened in many cities and areas of the Nineveh Plains.

Several factors affect Christian demography:

• The Christian population in the Nineveh Plains has been dispersed into isolated, unconnected islands and cities. Only some villages surrounding Alqos, and two villages near Telsquf and Batnaya are connected. The six Christian-majority cities in the Nineveh Plains are: Batnaya, Telsquf, Alqosh, Bartilla, Qaraqosh and Karmless). The other four Christian-inhabited cities are: Telkeif (majority Arabs), Sheikhan (majority Yazidis and Kurds), Baashiqa and Bahzani (65% Yazidis). The unknown number of Christian villages in Nineveh Plains are distributed according to administrative units as:

Telkeif: The centre (mixed with Arab majority now) and Batnaya.

Alqosh area: The area centre, Baqofah, Telsquf, Sharafiya, Bandwaye, Ein Baqre, Deshkotan, and Karango.

Sheikhan district: The centre (a small Christian population), Perozawa, and Garmawah.

Baashiqa district: The city centre and Bahzani (25%), the villages of Al-Faf. Mergy and Maghara.

Bartilla district: The Christian city centre (the percentage decreased from almost 100% in 1960s to 40% at present with Shabaks in the majority).

Al-Hamdaniya district: The city centre and Karmless.

This Christian demography is unlike the Yezidi, Shabaks, and Arabs, who are all located in urban and contiguous rural areas.

• Schemes of continuous demographic change began with the former regime and continued after 2003. In Telkeif, this was done by Sunni Arabs supported by Sunni political forces and with Gulf States funding. The Shia Shabaks supported by Shia parties and by Iranian funding also became demographic weapons. This has recently increased, post- ISIS, especially by the Shia Shabaks, with the political support of the central government and the military and security influence of Shia militias.

The weakness and fragmentation of Christian demography, on the one hand, and the weakness and fragmentation of effort and the political influence of Christian parties, on the other, means the Christians have a very weak and futile ability to face these demographic changes. In addition, the central government imposes difficulties and obstacles for obtaining documents such as identity papers. Citizens must visit the relevant departments in the centre of the city of Mosul. This is also the case when returning to official government work or to study at the university in Mosul. Many avoid this, which leads to not returning to Mosul or the Nineveh Plains but rather staying and integrating in the areas of displacement in the Kurdistan region or immigration.

• In parallel with the Christian demographic dispersion in the Nineveh Plains, Christians have a political dispersion and disagreement, albeit in a much more extreme manner, over the political vision of the Plains’ future, its administrative structure and its dependence between the centre and the Kurdistan region.

This lack of agreement results from the delayed start of explicitly ethnic political activity of the Christians of the Nineveh Plains. Historically, and even today, they submitted to the influence of the non-Christians powerful parties or the majority parties. Furthermore, because the Nineveh Plains is a field of conflict between the federal government and KRI, the Christians’ vision of the plains was/is divided between the influence of the centre (both Sunni and Shia) and KRG.

The Christian political forces could not even agree upon the demand to create a Nineveh Plains Province. The two members of Assyrian Democratic Movement, one of the largest Christian parties in the Iraqi parliament, voted on 26 September 2016 in favour of a decision not to change the administrative boundaries of the Nineveh governorate. Also, the Assyrian Chaldean political parties and Assyrian Democratic Movement did not agree to include the Nineveh Plains in the territories subjected to Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution.  This political dispersion and the lack of a unified vision has caused the Christian political and ecclesiastical authorities of the Nineveh Plains to miss the opportunity to have influential political forces in Iraq or the international community to support their causes.

Attractive international opportunities encourage continued migration from home. The large diaspora of Iraqi Christians offers more potential than the homeland, making it a magnet for those who remain in Iraq. This weakens the Christian presence and reduces the potential of the Christian community in the Nineveh Plains to face challenges; it becomes easier to escape the challenges and choose migration.

Requirements for sustainable Future

Action must be taken at the community, legislative and executive levels. Programs on the ground must be immediately launched, so as to reassure Christians in the Nineveh Plain that they are real participants in the region’s administrative and political decision-making.

Self-Community

• With the dispersed visions and efforts, contradiction and disagreement in many issues caused by the internal struggle within Christian community, it is necessary to launch and commit initiatives and organised frameworks to coordinate the political effort between the Christian political parties, on the one hand, and between them and the church references, on the other. They must agree on common issues and reduce differences and disagreements.
• Because current and future big political forces (Shia, Kurdish and Sunni) influence the future and structure of the political, administrative, and security administration of the Nineveh Plains, it is necessary to work on building political partnerships with these forces to serve a stable, participatory future among its components. With the demographic facts on the Nineveh Plains and its extensions in the Kurdistan region, partnerships with Kurdish forces are vital and positive. To achieve these alliances, especially the Kurdistan ones, the Christian political forces must change the populist, political discourse and Kurdish phobia.
• It is very important to apply Article 140 of the Constitution on the annexation and continuity of the Nineveh Plains with Kurdistan Iraq. The fragile Christian demography throughout Iraq cannot be divided into two separate demographics, each governed by a different constitution, legislations, administrative boundaries, and a different cultural and community atmosphere, especially as the administrative boundaries between KRI and the central Iraqi state will likely become a border between two states.
• It is very important to activate the economically and academically rich large Christian diaspora to invest its resources and potential in economic, educational and sustainable development program. Moreover, mechanisms and institutional frameworks must be developed to guarantee the professionalism and sustainability of these activities.
• While the declining Christian demography cannot be restored, the diaspora’s resources and network of institutional relations with churches and international organisations can launch and operate Christian initiatives and institutions that serve the entire Nineveh Plains. This could strengthen the Christian’s role in partnerships and social solidarity and compensate for the lost Christian demography.

Local Community

• A dialogue space should be launched to address issues of religious divisions and recommend positive religious discourse that avoids inciting hatred.
• Civil society should initiate programs of peaceful coexistence in which all community components, especially youth, participate in such activities as religious and national festivals, sports, artistic endeavours and media.
• Local administrative councils with secure financial resources could liberate communities from the control of both political parties and the central administration of the Nineveh governorate.
• The district or sub-district councils should determine programs and services in the centres of districts and sub-districts. This is greatly important for Christians throughout the Nineveh Plains, and the Yazidis in Baashiqa. While Christians constitute the absolute majority in Qaraqosh (the centre of Hamdaniyah) and Yazidis in the centre of Baaşhiqa, for example, the Christians in the district of Hamdaniyah and Yazidi in the sub-district of entire Baashiqa (centre and villages) are the minority. When Christians are a minority in the district council or the area, the majority ethnic group of the centre of the district or the sub-district can reject their programmes. For example, the district council of Hamdaniya rejected a request to build a convent for nuns in Qaraqosh. Similarly, the council in the sub-district of Bartilla, with a Muslim majority, rejected the allocation of land to build a church in the centre of Bartilla, the Christian city. Administrative decisions can assist in the demographic change; for example, the council of the sub-district of Bartilla built a residential complex in Bartilla, despite the Bartilla Christian community disapproval because of concern over demographic change.

National Iraq

• The Sunni Arabs must note the cumulative backgrounds and the context of the tragedy carried out by ISIS, addressing the roots of the tragedy and seek an atmosphere of acceptance, participation and coexistence.
• A serious national debate must be launched to study the tragedy, its causes, why and how it happened and preventative measures that prevent its recurrence. This is crucially important not only for justice for the victims, but also to reassure future generations that it will not recur. Laws must guarantee transitional justice and criminalise the discourse of hatred.
• All militias must be dismantled or pulled out of the Nineveh Plains. Public safety issues must be transferred to the security services and local police. In addition, in the short and medium-term, joint units between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi army, under control of the international coalition, will give a sense of demographic, social, and political security.
• A time limit must be set to implement the constitutional Article 140 under the supervision of the United Nations and the international community. In this context, adopt the 1957 census, because it is the only professional census conducted in stable political and security conditions without political agendas.
• When applying Article 140, the referendum must be held at level of the city and not the administrative unit. Christians are not a majority in any administrative units of the Nineveh Plains (both at the level of the district or sub-district), while they form a good or absolute majority in most cities where they live.
• The Nineveh Plains Province Formation Project must be adopted. It gives the components of the Nineveh Plains the power of administrative decision, economic planning and security control over their regions, and gives them a feeling and confidence in their role in building the future of their generations. If the governorate cannot be formed due to the political conflicts of the influential forces, it is important to annex the Christian and Yezidi demographics in the Nineveh Plains with Dohuk Governorate in order to ensure and strengthen the demographic connection.
• Because the central government is almost completely absent in the reconstruction programs of the Nineveh Plains, it must launch an adequately funded, special program to reconstruct, rehabilitate, and develop infrastructure and services in the Nineveh Plains.
• Reassuring messages must be sent from the central executive and administrative authorities, Nineveh governorate or from the various ministries and departments to the components of the Nineveh Plains. These messages should include granting them priority in managing government departments (health, education, services) and avoid provoking any of the religious, sectarian, or national components.
• National-level initiatives should recognise religious, sectarian and national components and respect their role in the history and civilisation of Iraq. This will have a positive role in building the national identity through cross-affiliations. For example, naming residential neighbourhoods, streets, schools, institutions in different Iraqi cities with names of personalities of different components would build bridges between these components. Also, identifying a national holiday for each Iraqi component will have a significantly positive impact on the recognition, coexistence, and mutual respect between these components.

International

• The international community should combat terrorism and dry up the sources of funding cross-border, systematic violence against religious minorities.
• International forces should recognise genocidal crimes and draw all legal, moral, and material consequences and implications.
• The international community and its institutions or influential countries must force the Iraqi federal government and KRI to commit to respecting human and minority rights in any political, economic, or military support programs.
• International, European or American office should be established to monitor the situation of minorities in the Nineveh Plains and submit periodic reports.
• A small Marshall Project should be launched for the reconstruction and economic development of the region.
• Institutional and community initiatives should support local civil society institutions and programs for peaceful coexistence. 

We might be helpless, but never hopeless.

Christian Assyrians, regardless of their ethic nomenclature and church affiliation, are indigenous people of Mesopotamia, the Iraq of today, and they have had, throughout history, a distinguished role that surpassed the country’s borders to serve various aspects of humanity. This role includes extending bridges, communication, and dialogue on ideology, culture, and science between East and West.

Their existence is threatened today because of what they were. They are still subjected to a well-planned campaign aimed to eradicate their existence from the Iraqi national memory and physically remove them from the land of their ancestors. This campaign utilises different means starting with the constitution and continuing with legislation, curricula, religious bigotry, and systematic physical removal of individuals and communities.

Today, the requirements to protect their existence in their homeland surpasses their capacity. Therefore, that protection becomes a collective responsibility of the Iraqi state and international actors. They suffer from a violation of international treaties set forth to protect human, social, and minority rights.

Today, the Assyrian Christians, after becoming a marginalised minority in their homeland, live on the hope of a future that will guarantee justice and dignity, for they, regardless of what they went through, still believe in that hope. We, Mesopotamians Assyrian Christians in Mesopotamia might be helpless but never hopeless. However, it is a conditional hope.

Let us keep our moral commitment in supporting and practicing the actions on the ground To Keep the Hope Alive[19].

The Landmarks Of The City

The historic Dalal Bridge is one of the most important Roman historical monuments in the region. Although its design and construction date back to the Roman era, there are many interpretations and stories about it. Including the Arab novel that the Arabs of the Abbasids built and called the Abbasid bridge (which is the name officially circulated).
There is a famous novel and myth about its building, which, given its heritage importance, popularity, and implications, we attach a definition to it.
Dalal Bridge has a total length of 114 meters and a width of 4.70 meters, and rises 15.5 meters above the surface of the river. It is constructed with carved stones

The Khabur River originates from Turkey to Iraqi territory and passes through the city of Zakho with a beautiful view before it flows into the Tigris River, where it represents the border triangle between Iraq, Turkey, and Syria.

The Khabur River originates from Turkey to Iraqi territory and passes through the city of Zakho with a beautiful view before it flows into the Tigris River, where it represents the border triangle between Iraq, Turkey, and Syria.
The river in Zakho is branched into two branches that pass through it and return again to be one river.

The Great Mosque of Zakho, was built after the Islamic invasion of Iraq in 641 AD.

Qishla (Barrack) or Zakho Castle is located on the western bank of the Khabur River.

The true history of this castle is not known, but some archaeologists believe that its history dates back to the third or fourteenth century AD.

As for the existing tower, it is older than the construction of the castle. And the castle was the home of the emirate during the era of the Emirate of Badinan. 

The Archdiocese of the Chaldean Church, as Zakho region and its extension in modern Iraq and southern Turkey, is among the areas that were Christian throughout history and included diocesan centres, monasteries, schools, and churches of the Church of the East and the Syriac Orthodox Church.

With the conversion of a large part of the Church of the East and Syriac Orthodox Church to the Catholicism church, Zakho gradually became an episcopal center for the Chaldean Catholic Church since the nineteenth century.

The Syriac-Catholic Church of the Virgin Mary was built in 1850.

Zakho Tunnel which forms with its 3600 meter the longest tunnel in Iraq.

It was constructed to connect Duhok to Zakho in a modern, safe and short cut road.

The tunnel was officially opened by the Prime Minister Nejirvan Barzani on September 2018.

Zakho after First Gulf War 1991

During the first Gulf War in 1991 and the uprising of the Iraqi people against the regime, which was suppressed in the southern Shiites governorates with unparalleled bloody violence, and the advance of Iraqi army towards Kurdistan region which led to the mass exodus of the people of Kurdistan to the Turkish and Iranian borders for fear of the attacks of the Iraqi army to suppress the uprising in this region as well. The United Nation declared Kurdistan Region (north of the 36th parallel) a safe haven and no-fly zone, which was protected by the international coalition forces led by USA.

One of the direct and immediate results of this no-Fly zone and safe heaven was the return of the displaced to the cities and villages, among them the thousands of destroyed villages in Kurdistan (more than four thousand villages) that the regime had destroyed between 1974 to 1988.

With this return, humanitarian organizations and international institutions interested in human rights, in addition to international networks and media, flocked to the region to work and be informed, each according to his interests.

On the other hand, the protection of this area requires a military presence of the coalition forces and its management and logistics centres.

Because of the important strategic location that the city of Zakho possesses in terms of being a border city adjacent to Turkey, participating in the operations of the International Coalition, and hosting its forces, Zakho has hosted the operations management center of the Coalition Forces, which made Zakho a center for most of the foreign humanitarian organizations operating in Dohuk Governorate.

With the increase in the importance of the city of Zakho for the above reason, its importance increased in terms of being the only outlet for the region to communicate and trade with the outside, because the Iraqi central government imposed a harsh siege on Kurdistan, which had no outlet for external communication except Zakho with Turkey and the border ports in Sulaymaniyah with Iran.

This importance of the city of Zakho, especially the commercial one, resulted in a rapid expansion of the city in terms of construction, housing, and work.

Zakho after Second Gulf War 2003

With the US invasion of Iraq and the fall of the regime in 2003 and the subsequent collapse of the Iraqi state in all fields, a security vacuum and the spread of chaos, armed militias and organized crime groups in central and southern Iraq on one hand, and Turkey’s economic potential compared to other neighbouring Iraqi countries on the other hand, in addition to security stability and the administration in the region and the existence of a long commercial experience with Turkey, the volume of trade exchange between Iraq and Turkey doubled from 870 million dollars in 2003 to 13 billion dollars in 2013.

Since 2011, Iraq has been considered the second-largest importer of Turkish exports after Germany, and it is a candidate to precede Germany in absorbing various Turkish exports, primarily iron, construction materials, food products, and others.

All of this exchange passes through the Ibrahim Khalil border crossing in Zakho.

Thus, Zakho turned into one of the most important Iraqi commercial outlets.

This led to more economic growth and urban expansion, not only in Zakho but also in the Kurdistan Region in general, as the customs resources constitute an important proportion of the region’s resources.

Zakho University

In year 2010 and due to the growing population of Zakho region on one hand, and the expansion of educational institutions on other hand, University of Zakho was founded to meet the needs of the high schools’ graduators to get academic studies in different fields.
Zakho University has now the below colleges/facualties:

1. Faculty of Science/ 6 scientific departments
   2. Faculty of Humanities/ 6 scientific departments
   3. College of Administration and Economics/ 3 scientific departments
   4. College of Engineering/ 2 scientific departments
   5. Faculty of Education/ 4 scientific departments
   6. College of Basic Education/ 5 scientific departments
   7. College of Medicine/ 2 scientific departments

The number of students is around 3000.

Zakho during ISIS (2014-2016)

At the beginning of August 2014, ISIS attacked and took over Sinjar district and committed genocide against the Yezidis who made up the majority of Sinjar district, all Yezidis of Sinjar district were displaced towards Dohuk governorate, and Zakho district (city and villages) had the largest share in receiving these displaced people who lived in school buildings, Mosques, churches, unfinished buildings, on sidewalks, under trees, and in the open.

The United Nations agencies, along with the regional government and international relief organizations, launched a wide program to establish camps to accommodate the displaced and provide them with the minimum requirements of living.

In Zakho district, six camps were built, the largest of which is (Jim Mashko), in addition to Bersify 1 and 2 camps, Bajid Kendal, Qadia, and Darkar.

While tens of thousands of families spread out in areas outside the camps, in villages and unfinished buildings, shared housing with relatives, or rented rooms for housing.

Zakho after ISIS (2017 – )

With the increasing importance of the Zakho district, especially the economic ones, and the continuous growth of commercial transactions with Turkey, in addition to its strategic location, the Kurdistan Regional Government decided in 2021 to make Zakho district a special administration directly linked to the Council of Ministers of the Region.

This means more care and attention specific to the district, and less red tape and bureaucracy in dealing with development and service programs in it.

On the other hand, Zakho is facing great challenges and difficulties:

Despite the restoration of control over the areas occupied by ISIS in the Nineveh Governorate (Sinjar, Nineveh Plain, and others), not all of the displaced have returned to their areas, especially in the Sinjar area. This is due to several reasons, including the extent of the destruction in these areas and the weak allocations for reconstruction on the one hand, and the security situation in terms of the multiplicity of military and security agencies in the Sinjar region (PYD (a Syrian version of PKK), the Popular Mobilization Forces (Shiite militia), the Iraqi army, Yazidi military formations, and Turkish military operations), In addition to the duplication of administration between administrative officials who are appointed by the Nineveh Governorate and others appointed by the de facto authority (PYD).

Therefore, thousands of displaced families in Zakho did not return to their areas in Sinjar, as the six camps still exist in Zakho (the largest of which is (Jim Mashko), in addition to Bersvi 1 and 2 camp, Baged Kendal, Qadia, and, Darkar).

On the other hand, Turkey, under the pretext of fighting the PKK, continues its military operations (air bombardment, the establishment of military sites and observation points, ground military operations, etc.) that led to the displacement of dozens of villages in the border area, including many Christian villages.

Ethno-religious diversity in Zakho

Like the rest of the districts and sub-districts in Dohuk Governorate and the whole of Kurdistan, the Zakho district includes a beautiful diversity of societal components, where there is religious, national, linguistic, and other diversity.

At a time when the Muslim Kurds constitute the vast majority in Zakho, there is a historical demographic presence of other ethno-religious communities.

Christianity in Zakho is rooted and deep since the beginnings of Christianity and the early church in Mesopotamia in the early Christian centuries.

The Church of the East is the church that has been always present in the district of Zakho and its extensions to the north to the region of Bhutan in present-day Turkey, to the south to the Nohadra region (Dohuk) and the Nineveh Plain, or to the east to the region of Aqrah and Erbil.

The district of Zakho is the center of the diocese of Zakho of the Chaldean Church since the nineteenth century. This diocese has 17 parishes in the villages of Zakho. The center of the diocese (the cathedral, the episcopal center, and their annexes) is located in the Mahalat Al-Nasara (i.e. Christian locality) in the center of the Zakho district. It was called by this name because it was a locality founded and inhabited by Christian families.

The Armenian Orthodox Church is present in Zakho, where it has a church and a parish in the center of the district, and even a residential locality called the locality of the Armenians.

The Syriac Catholic Church has a parish church at Zakho centre.

The Jewish presence has always been present in the areas of Zakho, especially in the city center, throughout history, but it has faded with the beginning of the twentieth century, and this presence has ended completely since the fifties of the twentieth century.

The Yezidi presence in the Zakho district is confined to a few villages belonging to the district of Rizgari, such as the village of Derabon, where Yezidis live with Christians.

Ethnically, in addition to the absolute Kurdish majority, the Assyrians Chaldeans, and Armenians historically lived in Zakho.

Linguistically, the Kurdish language is the dominant language in daily life and is the official language in departments and schools.

There is also Syriac spoken by the Assyrian Chaldean Syriac, which is also the curricula language of Syriac schools.

There are also Armenian and Arabic.

Economy

As all the people of Duhok, Zakho district inhabitants depend for their living resources on different sources of income:

The public sector, which constitutes the largest proportion of the workforce in the district, as well as all over Iraq, is a natural result of the nature of managing public utilities in Iraq, where the state manages them and not the private sector.

While this source was generating a stable and secure income for families, since 2014 it has declined a lot due to the financial crisis in the region, as public sector employees receive only 25% of their monthly salaries on an irregular basis.
As for the private sector, its most active and extensive field is the trade sector, due to the geographical location of Zakho, as it includes the most important commercial crossing for the region, which is the Ibrahim Al-Khalil-Silopi crossing with Turkey, and because the economic activity in the region for decades has lacked proper planning and support for the local product so that all Life needs (food, construction, health, etc.) are imported products.

Agricultural and livestock production, are sectors with very great potential provided by the topography nature of the region in terms of abundance of water, agricultural lands, and pastures for livestock.

However, despite these capabilities, the economic output of agriculture and livestock does not provide a good resource for farmers due to the lack of legislation and economic policies that protect and support the local product in the face of the imported product.

In any case, the economy of Zakho, similarly to the Duhok Governorate, is a fragile economy because it is generally a consumer economy with the absence of development programs for various economic activities in the industrial and agricultural fields.

Christians of Zakho Current Challenges

Zakho being part of Duhok governorate, and Zakho Christian community being part of Duhok and Kurdistan region Christian community, the Christians of Zakho face the same challenges.

Despite Duhok Governorate is one of the most important Iraqi governorates for its Christian presence in terms of demography (population and land) and in terms of the Christian presence and role, yet this presence faces real challenges that threaten the Christian existence and role in the medium and long terms.

In addition to the challenges that Iraq and the Region are facing from a general point of view, the Christians of the region face more challenges:

1- Continuous migration to the countries of the diaspora with the transformation of the diaspora into an appealing factor for families in the homeland, instead of it being a support factor for their existence. The migration is increasing because of the political, security and economic factors, in addition to the feeling of being discriminated and the fears caused by the growth of the political Islamic movements which collectively lead to the lack of future clear vision to achieve a stable state of equal citizenship.

3- The depletion of the economic resources and savings of Christian families in the host communities or those displaced to the Region from the rest of Iraq, which drained them with financial burdens and are now living in conditions of need and poverty that they have not experienced in previous decades.

4- The difficulties of integrating the displaced persons settled in the Region with the surrounding environment of the new area. All this resulting in restriction of employment opportunities, which are essentially already weak and limited, to the moral frustration resulting from the inability to communicate in daily life in the markets, schools or departments, weighs heavily on them.

5- Unequal opportunities between the Christian “minority” and the Muslim “majority” in the labour market in its public and/or private sectors.

6- The landgrab of agricultural lands in many Christian villages and towns that leads to economic loss for the people on one hand and threatening the identity of the villages on other hand.

7- The Turkish military operations are causing losses of properties and fields of the Christian villages nearby the borders and forcing the families to flee. In addition of deepening the feeling of mistrust of having a stable and secured life.

Prominent people from Zakho

Chor-Bishop Paul Bedaro (1887 – 1974)

He was born in the village of Bedaro, which is located two kilometres west of the city of Zakho.

He entered Saint John Priestly Institute for the Dominican Fathers in Mosul in 1900, graduated from it and was ordained a priest in 1912, and returned to his village of Bidar. Then he was sent to the village of Fishkhabur and served there for three years, from 1920 to 1923.

He worked as a teacher in Zakho and Mosul and was fluent in several languages: Syriac, Arabic, Kurdish, French, English, and Latin.

In the year 1933, year of Assyrian massacre in Sumail (nearby Duhok), he was sent to serve his people in Syria and Lebanon where he remained there until 1965, when he returned to his homeland, Iraq, as a fighter in the ranks of the Kurdish revolution in Iraqi Kurdistan.

He was very close to the Kurdish leadership.

He wrote a famous poem about Sumail massacre.

During the time of the Chaldean Patriarch Mar Paul Sheikho, he was ordained at the rank of Chor-Bishop and was appointed as a teacher at the priestly institute in Zakho.

Father Paul Bedaro was a faithful, energetic, successful, and effective priest who was familiar with the different aspects of life, society, and science. He moved from this foundation as a national and humanitarian fighter who lived the struggle practically on the mountains of his homeland Iraq. He was a great teacher and the author of many books and published books, including the manuscript in Syriac and Arabic, including: Syriac grammar book 1950, The Student’s Guide Book, The Book of My Beloved Nation, A collection of poetry on the Sumail massacre, The bomb of the Bedaro, The fall of kings, and other lost works.

Martyr Salih Al-Yousifi (1918 – 1981)

is one of the founders of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and one of its political leaders in various stages, whether in the stage of the Kurdish revolution or during the stages of political agreements with the Iraqi government.

He was assassinated by a parcel bomb on June 25, 1981, in Baghdad.

A monument was erected in the Zakho Center in 1997.

The artist Ardwan Zakholy (1957 – 1986)

is one of the well-known Kurdish singers who introduced modern music to Kurdish singing while preserving the spirit of performance and artistic style. He died at the age of 29 when he was poisoned by the Iraqi regime because of his stances on the regime. A monument was erected to him in Zakho.

Hazem Bek Yousif Basha (1901 – 1954)

was the minister during the royal era, as he was appointed as a minister in the government of Tawfiq Al-Suwaidi in 1950, and he was known as Father of the Poor.

Religions and denominations

Muslims – Sunni with small number of displaced Shiite families from Mosul

Christians: Chaldean Catholics, Syriac Catholics, Assyrian Church of the East, Ancient Church of the East, Syriac Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and recently couple of small planted Evangelical Churches.
Yezidis
Few Bahaies’ families

Ethnicities: Kurds, Assyrian Chaldean Syriac, Arabs, Armenians, and few Turkman

Languages: Kurdish, Syriac, Arabic and Armenian

Landmarks:     Assyrian archaeological sites in:

Maaltha (entry of Duhok), Khanas, Jarwana, and more

Citadel of Amadiya

Yezidi Lalash Temple – Sheikhan

Dalaly Bridge – Zakho

St. Sultan Mahdokht Church – Araden

St. Qayoma Church – Dore

Assyrian carvings in Maaltha (i.e., Entrance) – Shindokha Mount – Duhok

Introduction to Duhok

Duhok governorate is one of the three governorates that make up the Kurdistan Region of Iraq KRI, which is part of the Federal Republic of Iraq, where the region has a constitution, parliament, and government that has run its affairs since 1991 after declaring it a safe and internationally protected haven, then it was recognized as a region in the Iraqi constitution that was adopted in 2005 after toppling the former regime of Sadam Hussein.

Duhok Governorate was formed in 1970 as part of the March 11, 1970 agreement between the central government and the leadership of the Kurdistan Revolution, which at that time put an end to the continuous war in the Kurdistan region of Iraq since 1961 between Kurdistan rebels and successive Iraqi governments that refused to recognize the rights of the Kurdistan people to self-administer their region within the framework of Iraq.

The March 11 agreement did not last long until the regime breached and terminated it and the Kurdistan revolution returned once again to the adoption of armed struggle to achieve its demands.

Before its formation as a governorate, the administrative units of Duhok governorate were districts of the Nineveh Governorate (or what was previously called since the establishment of the Iraqi state in 1921, the Mosul Wilayat).

Duhok governorate witnessed tragic historical events.

In the town of Semele, adjacent to Duhok, which is now a district within the Duhok governorate, the first genocide in the contemporary history of Iraq took place on August 7, 1933, against the Assyrian Christians, who killed about five thousand of them, including children, women, elderly and men, for nothing but their demand that the Iraqi government implements its obligations towards them by settling them and providing them with public services after they were displaced from the Hakari region in Turkey in 1915 during the Ottoman genocide against Christians, where they fled to the areas of Duhok, which became part of the newly formed Iraqi state that was founded in 1921.

The Semele massacre at the hands of the Iraqi army, and the Iraqi government’s honouring of the army leaders for the massacre they committed was the gateway to other crimes in contemporary Iraq.

In 1941, was the looting campaign against the properties of the Jews in Baghdad. This campaign was called the Farhud, which became a public word used by Iraqis whenever referring to looting,  and since 1961 the military campaigns against the Kurdistan region of Iraq, in which the Duhok governorate had a large share of its tragedies, where, starting from 1974, the central government launched a campaign of displacement and destruction of nearly 5000 villages in the regions of Kurdistan, including thousand villages in the Duhok governorate, and more than a hundred Christian villages.

In many areas, Arab clans were brought in and settled to change the demographic identity of these areas, as happened in the Sulayvani and Semele areas in the Duhok governorate.

The regime also used chemical weapons in Halabja and Balisan.

In addition to this systematic destruction of life in the Duhok Governorate and Kurdistan region of Iraq, the Iraqi government has practiced a policy of economic and service marginalization of the region, as no economic programs were implemented in the province or the establishment of any university and other institutions and service facilities to keep the province affiliated with services and economically to Nineveh Governorate, which was one of the provinces loyal to the regime.

The situation in Duhok Governorate and the Kurdistan Region did not change until it was liberated from the regime’s control after 1991.

Duhok after First Gulf War 1991

In January 1991, the Gulf War took place under the leadership of the United States and the participation of more than 30 countries with the aim of liberating Kuwait from the Iraqi occupation. With the collapse of the Iraqi army at the end of February and the beginning of March, a general uprising broke out in all the southern (Shiite) provinces and the provinces of Kurdistan Region. The uprising led to the collapse of the governmental and Baath party system in these provinces, and the fall of 14 Iraqi provinces (out of a total of 18) to the uprising.

The response of the Iraqi government to regain control of these provinces, beginning with the Shiite provinces in southern Iraq, was bloody, as it relied on the Republican Guard forces and Baath party militias and used what was left of their aircraft to strike the uprising and the protestors and in order to re-control these provinces.

This bloody dealing with the Shiite provinces in southern Iraq led to spreading fear and horror among the people of the provinces of Kurdistan (Sulaymaniyah, Erbil and Duhok), which led them to mass exodus of millions of people at the end of March 1991 from all cities and villages in the region to the Iraqi-Turkish borders in the north and the Iraqi-Iranian borders in the east.

With this humanitarian catastrophe, the Security Council adopted a resolution declaring the north of the 36th parallel a safe haven that included the governorates of Kurdistan, to be protected by the international coalition forces, which forced the Iraqi army and the security and partisan apparatuses of the regime to withdraw from the area, creating a safe atmosphere for the displaced to return to their cities and areas in these governorates, including the governorate Duhok.

In fact, the safe zone not only created the opportunity to return to the cities and areas of displacement, but also provided the opportunity to return to the thousands of villages, which the regime had destroyed systematically in its continuous policies since 1974.

As Christian Assyrians, it is the first time in their history in their mother lands that they return to the villages from which they were previously forced to flee. The number of these villages exceeds one hundred villages in the governorate of Duhok; they were able to return, reconstruct and restore the life again. CAPNI had a role and a contribution to the reconstruction through the support of the partners of the churches, led by the Lutheran Churches in Bavaria and Württemberg. Big thanks to them.

With the withdrawal of the regime and its apparatus, including the administrative and governmental ones, the Kurdistan Front, which was a framework that included seven opposition parties, including the Assyrian Democratic Movement, administrated the region.

Later on, the parliament was elected in 1992 and a government was formed to administer the region. Kurdistan Region Iraq KRI lived through difficult years of double siege, where the international siege imposed on Iraq (and the region is part of it) and the central government’s siege on KRI.

The region relied in particular on trade and customs imports with Turkey and Iran, in addition to the contributions of humanitarian organizations.

The region also experienced a difficult stage of infighting between the two largest Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan PUK. This fighting led to the actual division of the region and in many areas into two spheres of influence between the two parties and created two administrations in the regions, one in Sulaymaniyah for PUK, and the other in Erbil to administer the governorates of Erbil and Duhok led by KDP.

The reconciliation between the two parties took place in 1998 under American auspices, but it did not end the differences and division between the two administrations.

KRI continued to enjoy self-administration independent of the central government until 2003 when the regime was toppled in April 2003.

Duhok governorate witnessed during this period (1991 – 2003) security and administrative stability that was positively reflected on society, especially with the return of inhabitants to return their destroyed villages, in addition to a remarkable development in the education and education sectors, where the University of Duhok was established, and the health services sector, in addition to the activity of civil society institutions and organizations, and other activities.

The region, during its period of independence from the central government (from 1991 to 2003), embraced the Iraqi Shiite opposition parties and the rest of the parties that later participated in the administration of Iraq after the fall of the regime.

Duhok After Second Gulf War 2003

With the fall of the former regime in April 2003, Iraq went through difficult and dramatic circumstances. The fall of the regime was more than a mere change of a regime. It was the collapse of a state with all its facilities, institutions, and laws. The previous regime was a totalitarian dictatorship that reduced the Iraqi state to the President of the regime.

With the fall of the President, the state collapsed and Iraq entered a terrifying emptiness in terms of lawlessness and the collapse of both security and military forces.

All this has made an appropriate and ideal environment for the provision of political parties and their militias to take the role of the state. Therefore, it extended its control and imposed itself in managing its areas of influence, not only in the security aspect but also in the economic, social, and cultural aspects according to its ideology, all of which were an extremist Islamic ideology.

Hence the deep state was born.

The collapse of the state and the lack of law enforcement allowed organized crime groups to target venture capitalists and elite people with murder and abduction for ransom.

In such circumstances, vulnerable and peaceful minorities were usually the easier target.

The programmed and systematic targeting of Christians, Yazidis, and Mandaeans was in the Iraqi governorates outside Kurdistan Region. The targeting was in a variety of ways, including the bombing of churches and their affiliated institutions, shops, businesses, and economic activity, imposing an Islamic cultural and social pattern on society, kidnapping for ransom, and other ways.

All of these events led to a mass internal displacement of Christians, Yazidis, and Mandaeans to the point their presence is non-existent in many Iraqi cities such as Anbar, Al-Amarah, Kut, Diyala, and others. Their institutional and economic activity in other large cities like Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and others has reached a terrifying number.

The destination of displacement was the Kurdistan region and the Nineveh Plain, where despite its official affiliation to the Nineveh Governorate and the Central government, its security management was in the hands of the Kurdistan Region and its security and military apparatus, and it was also a safe haven for the displaced.

Duhok governorate had its share of providing shelter to the displaced Christians and Yazidis fleeing terrorism and organized crime, seeking security and stability.

The number of Christian families in the cities and villages of Duhok governorate increased, especially with the launch of the Kurdistan Regional Government in 2006, a designated program with a huge budget for the reconstruction of all Christian villages in the governorate and the construction of service facilities such as churches, schools, and halls, in addition to the establishment of cultural, media, sports, and other institutions.

Thousands of homes and dozens of churches were built in Christian villages in Duhok Governorate.

Unfortunately, the program did not include economic development programs to create job opportunities for the unemployed youth or to develop the economic activity in the villages, such as agriculture, livestock, and others.

From here began the imbalance between the prominent Christian demographic presence in the Duhok Governorate and the resources and economic activities of the Christian community. In addition to the youth’s lack of perspective.

This imbalance has prompted many Christians, families, and youth, to emigrate in search of a better life and stability in European countries, America and Australia.

The mass exodus towards the region has also increased pressure on it, especially in the field of infrastructures, such as schools, health facilities, sources of electric power, water, and others.

In addition to this, the regional government’s lack of economic development plans, especially in Duhok, where economic facilities and facilities in industry and agriculture were not established and developed, and the available economic resources were not invested in this aspect. Rather, trade was relied upon as the location of Duhok makes it the most important trade corridor for Iraq with Turkey. In addition to the market’s dependence on Turkish products in all industrial, construction, food, and other fields.

Not to mention the focus on easy but short-term investments in real estate and apartment building.

These were all factors for the inability of the economic market to maintain the absorption of the labour force.

As a result, these were additional factors for more immigration of Christian families, especially those displaced from the rest of Iraq, who were unable to integrate with the environment in terms of language, culture, and communication.

Duhok during ISIS (2014-2016)

The security collapse and the weak ability of the Iraqi government to control and manage the country on the one hand, and sectarian conflicts on the other, in addition to the situation in Syria, provided an opportunity and an environment suitable for terrorist organizations of political Islam to spread their influence societally and expand its base and loyalists in Sunni areas.

It was the right opportunity for ISIS to control two-thirds of Iraqi territories in the summer of 2014.

In June 2014, ISIS took control of the more one million populated city of Mosul within hours as the Iraqi army collapsed there, leading to a mass exodus of remaining Christians (about 20,000), Yazidis, Shiites and Sunni elites to the Nineveh Plain and Kurdistan, where Duhok received thousands of families.

Two months later, specifically on 3^rd of August, ISIS expanded to take control of Sinjar committing genocide against Yazidis, as well as kidnapping women and children, and destroying villages and infrastructure.

It was the mass tragic migration towards Duhok.

Three days later, on 6^th of August, the group went east to take control of the larger area of the Nineveh Plain, forcing the inhabitants of the Plain to mass flee towards Duhok and Erbil.

Duhok province, which had 1.3 million people before the exodus, became 2 million.

Every two people in Duhok, the third was a displaced.

The humanitarian tragedy created by ISIS was the biggest topic of global attention politically, humanly and media and we don’t need to talk about it here.

But it should be noted that this tragedy and hundreds of thousands of displaced people, including Syrian refugees and dozens of camps, has become an additional burden on the province and the Kurdistan Regional Government, especially with the economic blockade imposed by the central government on the region, which has suspended payment of the region’s share of the Iraqi budget.

Infrastructure and service facilities from schools, health centers, electricity and drinking water are no longer bear under pressure from mass displacement.

The host community which has received the displaced and provided them with assistance, is now feeling the pressure as its economic resources are drained.

The living level of the residents of the province has declined and unemployment has increased and as a result migration rates have increased among Christians, especially among those displaced from Mosul and Nineveh Plain.

Duhok after ISIS (2017 – till now)

With the launch of military operations at the end of 2016 to restore control over the areas occupied by ISIS and its completion in the spring of 2017, the opportunity came for the displaced to Duhok to return to their areas, especially in the Nineveh Plain, where the security situation is more stable on the one hand, and the size of the destruction is less compared to Sinjar and the city center of Mosul on the other hand, in addition to the aid provided by the humanitarian organizations and international aid.

In parallel, the displaced Yazidi families from Sinjar began to return, but in a smaller and slower size, for reasons related to the security situation in Sinjar, the massive destruction carried out by ISIS, poor services, infrastructure, government support and reconstruction programs from humanitarian organizations.

The return movement reduced the burden on infrastructure and basic services (schools, health centres, electricity, drinking water, etc.) and the labour market in Duhok, and on the other hand, the number and size of humanitarian organizations operating in Duhok governorate declined.

With the political agreement between Baghdad and Erbil on Iraq’s budget for 2021 and the payment of the region’s dues from it, the economy began to gradually move and be active, including the start of paying the salaries of government employees in the public sector after they had received 25% of them since 2014.

However, because of the security and political instability, and thus the economic situation, in Iraq, it is not known whether the state’s commitment to employee salaries will last long.

Moreover, the economic development programs and investment in local economic resources are still missing, as there is still dependence on the imported product in general, especially from Turkey.

Ethno-religious diversity in Duhok

Duhok Governorate, like many other Iraqi governorates, is distinguished by its ethnic, religious and cultural diversity.

Even though the Muslim Kurds make the vast majority in Duhok, there is a historical demographic presence of other ethnicities and religious components.

Christianity in Duhok is embedded and rooted since the beginnings of Christianity and the first church in Mesopotamia in the early Christian centuries is evidence for that.

The Church of the East is the church that has always been present in the history of the Region. Different parts of Duhok were dioceses of the Church of the East extensive throughout histories, such as the Archdiocese of Banohdra (Duhok area), the Diocese of Dasin (Amadiya area), the Archdiocese of Marga (Aqrah area), and others.

In all areas of Duhok, there are the remains of dozens of monasteries and churches, just as the dioceses of Duhok gave birth to bishops, priests, writers, and theologians such as the scholar and theologian Mar Narsai (5^th century), Mar Mikha Al-Nohdary who founded a church school in the 4^th century, the Historian Thomas Al-Marji and many others.

Although this presence has gradually decreased due to numeral reasons, it has remained alive and present to this day, as in Duhok, stands all the Eastern Apostolic Churches:

Assyrian Church of the East, Chaldean Catholic Church, Ancient Church of the East, Armenian Orthodox Church, and more recently the wave of Christian IDPs from the rest of Iraq who settled in Duhok were a huge factor in establishing large Syriac Orthodox and Syriac Catholic parishes.

The Assyrian Church of the East has a diocese that covers all of the Duhok Governorate, its episcopal center is in the city of Duhok, and more than 40 parishes are subject to it. The Chaldean Church has two dioceses, the Diocese of Amadiyah and its center is Amadiyah, and the Diocese of Zakho and its center is the city of Zakho, and the two dioceses have more than 35 parishes.

In addition to Islam and Christianity, Duhok Governorate has a historical demographic presence of the Yezidis that dates to before Islam and Christianity. In Duhok province, specifically north of the city of Sheikhan, stands Lalish Temple, which is the holiest Yazidi temple in the world.

Ethnically, in addition to the absolute Kurdish majority, the Assyrians lived throughout history in Duhok, who still have a historical presence in it that dates back to more than a thousand years before Christianity, and its monuments and sculptures are still present and witness to these roots in Maaltaya (the entrance to Duhok), Fayda, Khans, Jarwana and others.

In addition to that, there are also the Armenians who settled there after the Armenian and Assyrian Genocide in 1915.

Alongside, there are Arab minorities, living in Semele and Fayda.

Due to the security conditions in the rest of Iraq, many Turkmen, Shabak, and Baha’i families were displaced and sought refuge in Duhok.

Linguistically, in Duhok, the Kurdish language is the dominant language in daily life and is the official language in governmental departments and schools.

There is also Syriac spoken by Assyrians, Chaldeans, Syriacs, which is also the language of instruction for Syriac schools.

Besides the aforementioned languages, there is also Armenian and Arabic.

In addition to the linguistic diversity of these components, their beautiful diversity is also in their traditions and cultural and artistic heritage of clothing, songs, folk dance, and games.

However, despite this ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity, all components have historically lived in peace and partnership in daily life and all its detail. Looking back one can rarely find incidents of religious and ethnic rivalry or conflict. For example, the Assyrian-Christian participation in the Kurdistan revolution exists and is distinct, both on the political level to lead the revolution, and on the operational level of the rebbels.

This participation has continued to this day in the legislative, executive, and administrative institutions, despite the presence of weaknesses and defects in this participation.

Economy of Duhok

The people of Duhok depend for their living resources on different sources of incomes:

The public sector, which constitutes the largest proportion of the workforce in the governorate, as well as all Iraqi governorates, is a natural result of the nature of managing public utilities in Iraq, where the state manages them and not the private sector.

While this source was generating a stable and secure income for families, since 2014 it has declined a lot due to the financial crisis in the region, as public sector employees receive only 25% of their monthly salaries on an irregular basis.

As for the private sector, its most active and extensive field is the trade sector, due to the geographical location of Duhok, as it includes the most important commercial crossing for the region, which is the Ibrahim Al-Khalil-Silopi crossing with Turkey.

Because the economic activity in Duhok for decades has lacked proper planning and support for the local product, so that all Life needs (food, construction, health, etc.) are imported products.

Agricultural and livestock production, which are sectors with very great potential provided by the topography nature of the governorate in terms of abundance of water, agricultural lands and pastures for livestock.

However, despite these capabilities, the economic output of agriculture and livestock does not provide a good resource for farmers due to the lack of legislation and economic policies that protect and support the local product in the face of the imported product.

Agricultural and livestock production, which are sectors with very great potential provided by the topography nature of the governorate in terms of abundance of water, agricultural lands and pastures for livestock.

However, despite these capabilities, the economic output of agriculture and livestock does not provide a good resource for farmers due to the lack of legislation and economic policies that protect and support the local product in the face of the imported product.

Tourism represents an important economic source for the governorate, especially during the summer period, as the governorate receives dozens of thousands of tourists from the rest of Iraq to spend beautiful times and enjoy the nature of its areas and in a moderate climate compared to the hot summer weather in the central and southern regions of Iraq.

In any case, the economy of Duhok Governorate is a fragile economy because it is generally a consumer economy with the absence of development programs for various economic activities in the industrial and agricultural fields.

Security conditions

The security situation in Kurdistan— Duhok in particular— is peaceful, serene and distinctly different from the rest of Iraq. This is in stark contrast to the image portrayed by foreign media, which inaccurately represents Kurdistan as a dangerous, lawless place. On the contrary, Kurdistan has a large and developed military, the Peshmerga, and its own police and security forces to protect its new and old residents. Duhok accommodated hundreds of international NGOs and foreign investors, and continues to see its tourism blossom among intrepid foreign travellers. To keep the security level high and protect the peace in Kurdistan, regular checkpoints are located along the borders and city perimeters.

Current challenges

Despite the restoration of control over the Iraqi regions, including those adjacent to Duhok (Nineveh Plains and Sinjar), from ISIS and the return of thousands of families to their areas and the closure of many camps for the displaced, and although this eased pressure on Duhok Governorate, the challenges facing the governorate are still great and in various levels and for many reasons.

Duhok governorate, being one of the eighteen Iraqi governorates, shares real challenges with the rest of the Iraqi governorates, either directly or indirectly, which are represented by:

1- The security instability in central and southern Iraq and the multiplicity of military formations and partisan militias that are practically not subject to the authority of the state and its military and security authorities, and the fact that many of them are under direct influence and dependence on Iran, which drains the Iraqi military and intelligence efforts and provides an opportunity and loopholes for ISIS to carry out terrorist operations and sow fear of its return to Iraqi scene.

2- The security instability and turning Iraq into a battleground between Iran and its allies of parties and militias on the one hand, and USA on the other hand, has led to political instability that affects the government’s work, performance, and programs at various levels.

The risks of political instability increased with the recent parliamentary elections and the loss of Iranian-affiliated parties’ parliamentary size, and their attempt to reject this by using violence that amounted to targeting the prime minister and his house.

3- Added to this is the accumulated and increasing political and financial corruption since 2003, as well as the deep state.

4 – It is natural that the security and political instability directly and significantly affects the activity and Iraqi economic growth and programs to rehabilitate and develop infrastructure and services. Foreign investments in Iraq are minimal due to the security and political situation and corruption.

These all affect all Iraqi governorates, either directly as in all Iraqi governorates outside the Kurdistan region, or indirectly on the governorates of the Kurdistan region, including Duhok.

In addition to this, the challenges facing Iraqi Kurdistan region, of which Duhok is part, include:

1- The accumulated financial crisis since 2014, which arose due to the failure of the federal government in Baghdad to pay Kurdistan region’s dues from the Iraqi budget due to the disagreements between Baghdad and Erbil on several political, security, and other matters.

This financial crisis, which coincided with the burden of the region receiving more than one million displaced people and refugees due to ISIS, led to an almost complete stagnation in daily economic activity throughout the region.

Even the salaries of public sector employees have only been paid by 25% and in arrears since 2014.

2- The absence of economic development programs and plans by the regional government and the lack of investment programs in the economic resources available in the region, especially in the field of agriculture and livestock, where the local product is not protected in competition with products imported from Turkey and Iran.

3- The political differences between Erbil and Baghdad on many issues such as the disputed areas, the oil and gas law, border gates, and others greatly affect the priorities of political decision-makers in the region at the expense of the daily needs of citizens.

In addition to its complexity of communication and movement between the region and the regions of the Nineveh Plains and Sinjar, which negatively affects the return of the displaced, as well as job opportunities, integration, and economic communication.

4- In addition, since last year, the Corona epidemic and its impact on the overall life, social and economic activity.

5- The phenomenon of climate change, in turn, poses a serious challenge to Dohuk province, as well as all of Iraq, in terms of its significant impacts on patterns of economic activity such as agriculture, livestock, tourism and others.

Some studies say Iraq is one of the five countries most affected by climate change.

6- The above reasons have largely limited the labour market, which is no longer absorbing the youth and the labour force of the region.

This is made worse by the cheap labour provided by the displaced to the region, as well as the Syrian refugees there, as Duhok Governorate alone hosts more than 200,000 Syrian refugees.

7- The threats and military actions carried out by the Turkish army, including the continuous airstrikes and bombing of villages and areas in the Kurdistan region, or ground military operations and the control of large border areas under the pretext of fighting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) led to the evacuation of dozens of villages in Duhok Governorate, including many Christian villages in Zakho and Barwari Bala regions.

In addition, in the recent period, terrorist acts carried out by armed Iraqi militias bombed Erbil airport, where the US military’s logistics services are located.

Christians of Duhok Current Challenges

Despite Duhok Governorate is one of the most important Iraqi governorates for its Christian presence in terms of demography (population and land) and in terms of the Christian presence and role, yet this presence faces real challenges that threaten the Christian existence and role in the medium and long terms.

In addition to the challenges that Iraq and the Region are facing from a general point of view, the Christians of Duhok (as well as the Christians of the rest of the Region) face more challenges:

1- Continuous migration to the countries of the diaspora with the transformation of the diaspora into an appealing factor for families in the homeland, instead of it being a support factor for their existence.

The migration is increasing because of the previously mentioned political, security and economic factors, in addition to the feeling of being discriminated and the fears caused by the growth of the political Islamic movements which collectively lead to the lack of future clear vision to achieve a stable state of equal citizenship.

3- The depletion of the economic resources and savings of Christian families in the host communities or those displaced to the Region from the rest of Iraq, which drained them with financial burdens and are now living in conditions of need and poverty that they have not experienced in previous decades.

4- The difficulties of integrating the displaced persons settled in the Region with the surrounding environment of the new area. All this resulting in restriction of employment opportunities, which are essentially already weak and limited, to the moral frustration resulting from the inability to communicate in daily life in the markets, schools or departments, weighs heavily on them.

5- Unequal opportunities between the Christian “minority” and the Muslim “majority” in the labour market in its public and/or private sectors.

6- The landgrab of agricultural lands in many Christian villages and towns that leads to economic loss for the people on one hand and threatening the identity of the villages on other hand. This project, in the activities of the Advocacy Sector, prepares an objective study and a comprehensive report on the trespasses to be addressed.

Brief History

As its name, and as many towns and villages in the Nineveh Plain there is no historical source documenting when and how Batnaya was founded.

But it certainly dates back to the 6th century AD and before it, where it received the monk Oraha (Abraham), who settled there at the beginning of the seventh century (circa 612), and is believed to have preached Christianity to Batnaya inhabitants and founded the nearby monastery, which bore his name: the Monastery of Mar (St.) Oraha.

The village was populated by Assyrians, all of whom were adherents of the Church of the East until a number of people adopted Catholicism at some point in the early 18th century before 1729.

The village and its church were plundered by the forces of Shahanshah Nader Shah in 1743 amidst the Ottoman–Persian War of 1743–1746 and the church was restored in the following year.

By 1767, the village’s entire population of 200 families had joined the Chaldean Catholic Church.

When visited by the English missionary George Percy Badger in 1852, 60 families resided at Batnaya and William Francis Ainsworth counted 50 houses in the village in 1857.

The population grew to 900 people by 1867 and then to 1000 people in 1891.

In 1913, Batnaya was inhabited by 2,500 Chaldean Catholics with three priests. The church of Mar Quryaqos was rebuilt in 1944.

By 1961, the population of Batnaya had reached 3104 people. According to 1997 census, Batnaya inhabitants were 3331.

After 2003, the number was almost doubled as dozens of Christian families (Batnaya and other origins) fled Iraqi central and southern cities seeking safety in Nineveh Plains which was under security control of Iraqi Kurdistan Government.

In summer 2014 before ISIS invasion Batnaya inhabitants were more than 6000.

Batnaya Before ISIS

Batnaya has lived through centuries of stability and peace, as have the rest of the Nineveh Plain, where it has never been displaced or subjected to violent campaigns and attacks before ISIS on 6^th August 2014.

Even the policies of Arabization and demographic change by all means exercised by the former regime against Christian cities in the Nineveh Plain had not begun in Batnaya.

Batnaya, like the rest of the Nineveh Plain, despite being under the Federal (central) government jurisdiction, was under the security control of Kurdistan regional government, making it a safe haven free of attacks, bombings, terrorism and organized crime that prevailed in the rest of Iraq and targeted mainly non-Muslim minorities, Christians, Yazidis and Mandaeans.

As a result of this safety in the Nineveh Plain, all its cities, including Batnaya, have hosted hundreds of Christian families displaced from various Iraqi cities (Mosul, Baghdad, Basra, etc.).

While this has helped protecting the lives of displaced people on the one hand, and many have contributed to the revitalization of economic life in the Nineveh Plain on the other, they have at the same time placed an additional burden on infrastructure, services and basic facilities, especially since these structures were weak in themselves because of the former regime’s policies of marginalization towards non-Arab and non-Islamic regions and communities.

Public Services

Before ISIS, Batnaya had a number of government service institutions as below:

 Schools

Before ISIS, Batnaya had:

• A kindergarten run by the Dominican sisters, and another unfinished government kindergarten.
• Two primary schools, one for males and one for females.
• One mixed secondary school (intermediate and high school).

Graduates of the high school (Abitur) were attending Mosul University for the academic university studies.

Health Services

Batnaya had a primary health care center that provided simple basic treatment services during official working hours, while the nearest clinic was in Telkeif.

For specialized or in-hospital treatment, Mosul doctors and hospitals were the closest.

Livelihood And Resources

Like the rest of the townships and cities in the Nineveh Plain, where the region is economically marginalized and not included in government economic development plans and the non-establishment of production plants and other activities, the economic resources of the Batnaya community were limited.

Employment in the public sector and government departments (Schools, Health, Municipality, etc.) in Batnaya, Telkeif and Mosul was one of these resources.

The private sector has been limited to limited-service activities of limited size and number, such as small markets, barber shops, butcher, carpentry, electrical installations and others, for which the economic market has remained limited in Batnaya and has not been able to attract customers from outside Batnaya because of its inability to compete with the similar but larger markets and services in the nearby towns of Telkeif and Telesquf.

The limited private sector has led many young people and families from Batnaya to move and settle in large cities inside Iraq, such as Mosul, Baghdad, Basra, Erbil, etc., in search of work and improving the family’s standard of living, many of whom have succeeded in establishing and developing their own economic activities in industry, trade, and hotels and restaurants.

Rainwater-based agriculture, particularly wheat cultivation, has been a traditional economic activity for Batnaya families, who own large tracts of land suitable for this type of agriculture. But productivity has declined significantly in the last decade due to climate changes that have led to a drop in rainfall. 

Community Spaces

Although Batnaya is relatively limited in terms of the number of families compared to Telkeif, Telesquf and Alqosh, as well as its proximity to the city of Telkeif, the capital of the District of Telkeif, Batnaya has had good sports and community activities.

Since 2006, with the financial support of the Kurdistan regional government, Batnaya sports club has been established a small but suitable open court has been installed.

Community space was also available in a park inside Batnaya, frequented by families for good community times as well as popular celebrations.

Batnaya also had a small, suitable hall used for weddings and condolences.

In addition to a number of cafés that young people used to visit, especially in the evenings.

Churches

Batnaya, like various Christian townships and villages in Iraq, has more than one church, one of which is the large church dedicated to the patron saint of the village and the rest of the churches are small churches or shrines.

The patron saint of Batnaya is Mar (St. in Syriac) Quryaqos the martyr, where the big church bears his name and is in the middle of Batnaya on a slightly high position. It is a large church with a magnificent design from within, with alabaster columns as well as the sacred altar.

The church of Mar Quryaqos, which is believed to have originally been a monastery, is mentioned in 1474, in which year a manuscript was copied there by the priest Īshō, son of Isaac, of Hakkari.

Its last renovation before ISIS was in 1944, and was rehabilitated three years ago, where it was harmed and maimed during the occupation of ISIS.

The commemoration of St. Quryaqos is on the 15th of July of each year, where the divine mass is held by the diocesan Bishop of Alqosh and with the broad participation of the community living there and the scattered in the different places of Iraq as well as many families coming from the diaspora for this occasion, as well as the participation of families from nearby towns and villages such as Telkeif, Telesquf, Alqosh and others.

After the Divine Mass, the people gather in the open space near the church where they keep celebrating the day, dancing folk dances and singing till the sunset.

In addition to the Church of St. Quryaqos, there is the Church of Mart Maryam (Virgin Mary and in Arabic: al-Tahira, “all pure”) which was constructed in 1866 next to St. Quryaqos church.

There is also the Monastery of St. Joseph which is a large house inhabited by Dominican nuns before ISIS, which also has rooms and halls for Christian education and kindergarten for the education of children.

Batnaya has a shrine dedicated to Mart (St.) Shmony (Female Saint from Maccabees B.C.) where Batnaya graveyards are centered and visited by people on Mart Shmony commemoration in May each year to perform prayers.

Near Batnaya, the Monastery of Mar Oraha (St. Abraham) is located about one kilometer from the east, where the community and nearby villages visit it annually on Mar Oraha commemoration day, the second Sunday after Easter.

In 2008, the Kurdistan Regional Government renovated the monastery and built more than 25 houses where a number of villagers lived.

Prominent from Batnaya

Bishop Mar Shlemon Warduni A Chaldean Catholic Bishop born at Batnaya, on April 24, 1943, and was ordained priest on June 1968. On January 12, 2001, he was appointed Auxiliary Bishop of the Chaldean Patriarchate and he was consecrated bishop on February 2001, by Patriarch Mar Raphael Bidawid.

After the passing of Patriarch Mar Raphael Bidawid, Bishop Warduni fulfilled the patriarchal duties (Locum tenens) till Patriarch Mar Emanuel Delli was elected on December 2003.

Bishop Warduni was appointed by the Chaldean church as the president of Caritas – Iraq.

Batnaya Diaspora

Immigration to USA, Europe and Australia for various reasons, including economic, has also covered Batnaya, as have all Christian community in the different Iraqi regions, cities and villages, and the number of immigrant families has escalated after the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, increasing further after the 2003 war and increase again after the occupation of ISIS. The Batnaya diaspora is particularly concentrated in America.

CAPNI and Batnaya

With the toppling of the former regime in 2003, CAPNI had the opportunity to expand the geography of its then-confined work in Dohuk province to include the Nineveh Plain, which includes an important Christian demographic and has suffered for decades from economic and service marginalization from all Iraqi regimes.

The fall of the regime went beyond the fall of the ruling group to the collapse of the Iraqi state with all its organs, including security, military, judicial, service and others, which soon created a vacuum filled by the forces of fait accompli, especially the parties and forces that owned the militia and extremist fundamentalist ideology that practiced systematic terrorism directed at non-Muslim minorities, Christians, Yazidis and Mandaeans, who became the easy target of these forces, and became the soft target of organized crime gangs that practiced threats and kidnapping to blackmail money from Christian families in various cities and regions of Iraq that were under the former regime before it was overthrown.

This has led to thousands of families migrating from these areas to Kurdistan and the Nineveh Plain, which was under security control of Kurdistan government.

This was an additional reason for CAPNI to switch its targeting area from Dohuk to the Nineveh Plain to serve displaced people in various service, health, education and other programs.

Batnaya has had its share in hosting displaced families, many of whom are originally from Batnaya who have left earlier for Iraqi cities in search of a better life.

Batnaya had its share in CAPNI programs. Indeed, CAPNI was almost the only acting NGO who had sustainable presence and activities in Batnaya after 2003.

Below are some of the programs carried out by CAPNI in Batnaya from 2003 to summer 2014 before the occupation of ISIS:

• Continued distributions of food and hygiene baskets for new displaced persons and needy families
• The establishment of the Student Service Center in Batnaya, which was a suitable space for students to meet to strengthen their study knowledge through its free services of copying and printing, internet service, library and others

In addition to its continuous organization of catch-up courses for formal schools’ subjects, especially for graduating classes (Abitur) to improve their graduation exams marks.

• Vocational trainings to develop the skills of young people in various fields according to the need of the market and for the purpose of providing them with jobs.
• Provide small grants or loans to young people and women headed families to start their own businesses.
• Support farmers with seeds and agricultural fertilizers.
• Awareness and therapeutic health services through courses and lectures as well as regular visits of CAPNI mobile clinic.
• Support for the Church’s pastoral programs: catechesis, Bible study, Syriac language, awareness and guidance lectures on various subjects.
• Construction of eight apartments for free housing of displaced families. 

We seize the opportunity to extend our profound gratitude to the partners who were generous to support these projects: Evangelical Lutheran Churches in Bavaria and Wuerttemberg, Caritas, Barnabas Fund, and others.

Batnaya under ISIS

14^th June 2014 ISIS occupies the over million-strong city of Mosul and Iraq’s second largest city.

The options available to Christians who were then living in Mosul were either Islam, jizya, murder or fleeing.

Thus, the Christians of Mosul were forced to leave their historic city, roots, churches and all their assets and belongings and fled in search of live saving, safety and security.

This is the first time in Mosul’s history that it has happened or that its Christian people have left it.

This is the first time in history that the bells of Mosul’s churches have been silenced.

Escape to where?

The Kurdistan Region and the Nineveh Plain (which was under the security administration of the Kurdistan Region) were the places where Christian families fleeing Mosul sought refuge.

Batnaya had its share of hosting large numbers of these families.

But, did the chapters of the story end there?

On 3^rd August, ISIS terrorists headed to the Sinjar area, where the peaceful Yazidi community has lived for centuries.

ISIS has committed the most egregious genocide against the Yazidis: thousands have been killed and many of them are buried alive in mass graves, thousands more women have been taken and enslaved for sexual slavery, children have been taken to be raised as soldiers of the Islamic caliphate.

In addition to the destruction of all that ISIS could destroy in the Sinjar area.

Hundreds of thousands of Yazidis fled naked barefoot and on foot towards Mount Sinjar and from there to Dohuk province.

It was the tragedy of the times, and a stain on the history of inhumanity.

It was the alarm bell for what was coming to happen in the Nineveh Plains.

The alarm bell gave the Nineveh Plain residents Christians, Yazidis, Shiites Shabaks and others a 72-hour chance to escape before ISIS headed to occupy the Nineveh Plains on the night of 6/7 August.

It is a painful coincidence that this happened on the same date as the first genocide in Iraq’s modern history when the Semele massacre was committed on 7th August 1933 against Assyrian Christians.

With ISIS’s occupation of the Nineveh Plain, all its inhabitants, except for Sunni communities that hosted and coexisted with ISIS in Telkeif, Nimrod and elsewhere, fled to the Kurdistan Region, and other hundreds of families left the country to neighboring countries in Jordan and Turkey.

Nineveh Plains became a ghost area.

The geographic borders of ISIS’s occupation of the Nineveh Plain stopped towards Erbil at the Khazir River, and towards Alqosh stopped between Batnaya and Telesquf.

Batnaya thus became the only city that remained on the front, as it turned into an ISIS military base from which they bombard the positions of the Peshmerga forces, and in return they were bombarded by the Peshmerga forces and the international coalition.

This led to the widespread destruction of Batnaya, where the rate of destruction reached more than 70%.

ISIs fighters had inflicted significant damage to the village as the church of Mart Maryam, which had been used as a weapons dump, was blown up whilst the church of Mar Quryaqos was ransacked, and only 1% of the village’s 997 houses was still intact.

Much of the devastation happened during the day-long Battle of Batnaya – between ISIS and the Peshmerga, backed by the Iraqis – and the terror group enacted a policy of scorched earth before retreating to Mosul, the self-proclaimed capital of its so-called Caliphate.

In addition of tunnels which ISIS dug deep under people’s houses. They built a fairly extensive network – up to 10 homes had tunnels underneath – during the occupation.

A tower at the back of the church also remains standing. It was a vantage point used by ISIS snipers before the re-controlling Batnaya, and where the Peshmerga later raised the cross.

ISIS terrorists in Batnaya were of different nationalities, as shown by the writings they left on the walls, where the writings and their dictation differed from the Iraqi style of writing.

Among the writings of foreign terrorists in Batnaya was German-language graffiti on the walls of church rooms.

This concentration of foreign terrorists in Batnaya reflects its military importance as the front line of ISIS, which if it collapses, the road to Mosul will be open. This happened when it was recaptured on 20 October 2016 by the Peshmerga forces and with the support of the international coalition, after regaining control of it, these forces headed to Mosul without any resistance.

There were more than 100 ISIS fighters in the town. Around 60 were killed during the fight.

There were bullet marks everywhere in mar Quryaqos church and the altar has been desecrated, a wine-red carpet leading down from where priests conducted services for hundreds of years, was strewn with broken concrete, wood and smashed marble.

Batnaya post ISIS

Although the recapture of Batnaya and the expulsion of ISIS from it took place on 20 October 2016, the first ten families returned to it at the end of May 2019, unlike the rest of the areas in the Nineveh Plain where families began to return by spring 2017.

This in itself reflects the challenges Batnaya faced after ISIS and the difficulties faced by displaced families to return to it.

• The huge destruction of the homes and families’ assets.
• Collapse of basic infrastructure and services.
• Explosives and minefields scattered in and around Batnaya.
• Lack of livelihood sources.

In addition, there are other important challenges:

• Trying to get it seized by Sunni Arabs from Telkeif and Mosul by sowing terror among families of the dangers of returning and breaking their will and desire to return, which may gradually encourage them to sell their houses and land. Removing this horror required a lot of effort, especially by working on the rehabilitation of houses and infrastructure, the removal of mines and the provision of a viable environment in Batnaya, which later encouraged families, starting in May 2019, to return.

• The security situation and freedom of movement to Batnaya from Telesquf, Alqosh and Dohuk, where Batnaya displaced families live or where their youth and children work or study. Batnaya is under the security control of the central government, and even under the security control of the Popular Mobilization Forces, which runs the check point on the road to Telesquf. With the tensions between the federal government and the Popular Mobilization Forces on the one hand, and the Kurdistan Government and the Peshmerga on the other, especially after the referendum on the independence of Kurdistan in October 2017 and the subsequent military confrontations between the two parties, the families were not encouraging or wanting to move to and from Batnaya due to harassment from the check point and members of the Popular Mobilization Forces. However, with the decline of these tensions, the stabilization of the security situation and the improvement of relations between Erbil and Baghdad, the situation has become normal for movement and communication.
• The social vacuum and psychological pressure on families in Batnaya as it remained a ghost town even after it was re-controlled, and the families’ seeing the rubble and destruction in all of Batnaya and the lack of open community spaces for families, youth and children. This issue has been partially addressed in terms of the number of returning families and the cleaning of roads from rubble (the rubble of destroyed houses is still not cleaned). But there is still a lot to do.

This is why CAPNI is focusing to conduct the coming project(s) in Batnaya which is rising from the rubble. We need to join the efforts to Keep Batnaya Hope Alive.

Rabban Hormizd’s monastery library was rich in manuscripts in Syriac language.

Due to the attacks with the beginning of the Ottoman-Persian War the monastery was abandoned.

Rabban Hormizd Monastery is built half about half way up the range of mountains which encloses the Nineveh Plain on the north, and stands in a sort of amphitheatre, which is approached by a rocky path that leads through a narrow defile; this path has been paved by generations of monks. The church is of stone and is of a dusky red colour; it is built upon an enormous rock. In the hills round about the church and buildings of the monastery are rows of caves hewn out of the solid rock, in which the stern ascetics of former generations lived and died. The convent has neither doors nor any protection from the inclemency of the weather, and the chill which strikes into the visitor gives an idea of what those who lived in them must have suffered from the frosts of winter and the drifting rain. The cells are separate one from the other, and are approached by narrow terraces, but some of them are perched in almost inaccessible places, and, unless other means of entrance existed in former days, could only have been approached by the monks crawling down from the crest of the mountain and swinging themselves into them.

In 1859 a new monastery (Monastery of our lady protector of the crops) was erected in the plain near Alqosh.

Church and School of Mar Mikha Nohadraya (i.e. from Nohadra (the ancient Christian name of Duhok region)

Mar Mikha Nohadraya Church is one of the oldest urban and civilized edifices with its structure so far in the old town of Alqosh. Its construction coincided with the life of Mar Mikha himself when he came to this village and settled there in 414 AD.

Mar Mikha was born in the village of Banuhadra, present-day (Dohuk) in the year 309 AD.

In 415 AD, Mar Mikha built a monastery and a church with the help of the villagers.

This church included three structures, two of which were removed due to their demolition and the inability to restore them. The last date of the renovation of this church is the year 1876 AD, and it is installed on a stone slab above the niche of the Mar Mikha shrine, which is located to the right side of the altar of the church. There is another niche on the left side of it, which includes a burial for part of the remains of the prophet Nahum. The writing there reads: The Vault of Bones of the Prophet Nahum.

Prophet Nahum Tomb

Nahum’s tomb lies only 2 km west from the Rabban Hormizd monastery and the monastery of Our Lady of the Seeds, on a gentle slope at the foot of the limestone mountain range of Alqosh, just above the Chaldean churches of Mar Gewargis and Mar Mikha.

The ancient existence of Nahum’s mausoleum has been confirmed for a long time. According an old identification, the synagogue (and not the tomb) would date from the 12th century, but some hagiographical elements would also date it from the 10th century. The current synagogue has been restored and rebuild quite recently, at the end of the 19th century.

Both past and present travellers all relate the same fact: “the inhabitants from Alqosh all claim they possess the tomb of the prophet Nahum and his sister Sara.” Nothing indeed enables to prove the authenticity of the tomb. Only the tradition remains.

Nahum’s mausoleum is made of coated-stones, and the building is today partially dilapidated. It undoubtedly is a synagogue, with the prophet’s tomb right in its centre, and in the inner courtyard, the tomb of Nahum’s sister, Sara, as well as a religious school and a storeroom.

The building is enclosed by a surrounding wall, with several sides (west, south and east) that have collapsed.

The inner courtyard occupies more than a third of the total area. The different rooms are situated on the northern, western and eastern parts. The synagogue and its mausoleum take up the southern half of the compound.

Right after the entrance, a flight of 7 steps takes you down to the synagogue. It still has a nice architecture of coated stones. The groin vaults rest on several low and stable square pillars, whose pattern “features the 12 tribes of Israel”.

Nahum’s tomb stands right in the centre, enclosed with a thinly wrought metal fence and surrounded by the 4 central pillars, on which one can read, engraved in the stone, some Hebraic inscriptions taken from the Book of Nahum. “These inscriptions are exactly the same as these in the Torah”. The rectangle-shaped and prominent prophet’s tomb is covered with a green cloth. Two niches are arranged within the western wall of the synagogue: one for the Torah scroll and the other one for votive candles.

A roof made of sheets of metal has been built above it but offers very little protection.

Shiro Malektha

It is the archaeological Assyrian slope that is located in the heart of the mountain valley north of the village of Bandawaya, located 7 km west of the town of Alqosh. It was carved in relief and contains a rectangular niche with dimensions of 4 m in height, 183 cm in width and 74 cm in depth, and on a gaint rock standing in the middle of the valley.

There is a prominent sculpture 124 cm long representing a man. This sculpture is attributed to the Assyrian King Senharib (704-681 BC). This king left such a sculpture in Maalthaya near Dohuk and another one in Khanas (south of Sheikhan), and in another watering project near Nineveh. The word Sheru Malektha is derived from two words, the first (Shiru) Assyrian (Sarru), meaning king, and the second (Malkatha) Syriac, meaning queen, meaning king and queen.

There is a tunnel dug under this sculpture, it is said that the Assyrian Queen Shamiram had used it to raise the water level of the river that runs in the valley to the level of the plains of the arch in the east for watering. There is also, to the southeast of the river, an extension of an earthen canal that ends to the northeast of the village of Hatara.

This channel formed the course of the ancient river through the mentioned plains, its earthen sides crumbling due to neglect and the deviation of the river’s course from it.

Patriarch Polus Sheikho (1906 – 1989)

He assumed the patriarchate in 1958.

He was famous for his ardor for building churches, monasteries and schools, so he built nearly forty churches, monasteries and schools.

He ordained thirty-three bishops, dozens of priests and deacons, and participated in many sessions of the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council.

When the previous regime in the seventies of the last century issued a decision to impose the teaching of the Quran on all non-muslim students, Patriarch Sheikho opposed the issue with clear, frank and strong positions, and his positions, in addition to the state of popular rejection, were a reason to stop the implementation of the decision.

Toma Thomas

Toma Thomas was born in Alqosh, in 1924, he was an adherent to the Chaldean Catholic Church. He witnessed the Simele massacre first-hand when Assyrians escaped the massacres to Alqosh. This event was crucial in shaping his political ideas in the future.

After finished elementary school in Alqosh, he moved to Mosul where he finished high school. He later found his way to Kirkuk to work at an oil company. There he joined the Iraqi Communist Party in the early 1950s.

He moved to his home town after the 1958 14 July Revolution which brought the communists to power. The situation didn’t last long however. The communists were summarily executed and some headed by Toma Tomas fled to the mountains of Kurdistan where they formed armed guerilla’s known as the Ansar and joined the Kurds in their struggle against the central government.

For almost 30 years Toma Thomas led the Ansar in many battles against the Iraqi army in the region stretching from the Turkish borders to Telkeif to the south.

He died in Syria on 15 October 1996 and was buried in Duhok.

His remains were reburied in his home town Alqosh in 2010.

Benjamin Haddad (1931 – )

Benjamin Haddad was born in Alqosh, 01 July 1931

He worked in the field of comparative language, and was interested in history, heritage and folklore. He wrote for literary purposes in both Syriac and Arabic.

He has about thirty books, letters and publications in the aforementioned fields.

One of his most important works is (Encyclopedia of the Monasteries), a historical, geographical, scientific, and spiritual study that deals with the study of more than 1,200 existing and destroyed monasteries along the map of the ancient East (from China and Afghanistan to North Africa, from northern Asia Minor to southern Oman and Yemen). It is in 8 volumes with a total of 1700 pages.

CAPNI covered the printing costs and the copy rights of this precious work.

In addition to the (Rawd al-Kalam) dictionary, which is located in two large volumes and more than 1200 pages. It is a dictionary (Arabic – Syriac).